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Executive Summary 
The West experienced very high wholesale power prices in 2000-2001 and debate continues 
about the extent to which these prices were the result of market fundamentals as opposed to 
market manipulation.  Although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) eventually 
investigated claims of market manipulation in Western wholesale electricity markets, the 
situation prompted state regulators and policymakers that participate in the Western Interstate 
Energy Board Committee on Regional Electric Power Cooperation as well as some industry 
market participants to seek to develop some independent capability to monitor wholesale markets 
in the West. 
 
In the electric industry, market monitoring involves the systematic analysis of prices and 
behavior in power markets to determine when and whether potentially anti-competitive behavior 
is occurring.  Historically, federal and state regulators have overseen utilities’ rates and costs to 
provide electricity service to ensure that consumers were protected from abuse from monopoly 
companies.  As market forces have been introduced into parts of the power industry over the past 
two decades, part of consumers’ bills reflect prices set in markets, rather than cost-based rates. 
Regulators have begun to look at mechanisms, such as market monitoring activities, as one way 
to help assure that prices set in markets are not adversely impacted by market manipulation. 
 
For a number of reasons, Western wholesale power markets are somewhat more opaque than 
those in some other parts of the country.  For example, a substantial amount of electricity trade in 
the West occurs through bilateral markets, with a limited amount of information about 
transactions reported on electronic trading platforms. Also, many utilities in the West are 
essentially vertically integrated, tending to meet their incremental needs through investment and 
bilateral contracts rather than the shorter-term transactions that are typically the focus of market 
monitoring.  The Western Interconnection outside of California and Alberta also does not have 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) that administer short-term markets and 
transactions, collect and publish voluminous market data, and maintain formal market 
monitoring functions.    
 
In light of the special characteristics of Western markets, what kinds of market monitoring 
functions can be developed that work well for the West?  This study examines the feasibility of 
West-wide market monitoring given readily available data.  We explore two main analytic 
techniques for market monitoring: the econometric analysis of wholesale power prices and a 
particular type of production cost modeling.  Of the two, we conclude that the econometric 
approach is likely to be more feasible and could be a useful addition to West-wide market 
monitoring efforts.  Our focus on analytic techniques is intended to support discussions in the 
West on how the Western power market can be effectively monitored on a routine basis using a 
variety of analytic tools, information screens, and other market-monitoring resources.   These 
larger and important institutional implications, including the relationship between FERC 
activities and those that would be sponsored in the West, were not part of the scope of our study. 
 
Analytic tools and approaches   
 
There are a number of analytic techniques that can be used to assess competitive conditions in 
wholesale power markets.  These techniques vary in terms of their analytic sophistication, ease 
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of use, and data intensity.  Essentially, each method attempts to establish a benchmark for 
wholesale prices in a well-functioning competitive market.  Our study reviews a wider set of 
techniques, and focuses on two specific techniques, econometric analysis and production cost 
modeling.   We also describe issues that affect the process and institutional setting for market 
monitoring in the West outside of California and Alberta.  In particular, we examine the roles of 
a few existing “company-specific market monitors.” We observe that they tend to focus on 
monitoring the potential for affiliate abuse within vertically integrated utility company (e.g., a 
utility discriminates in favor of its own generation affiliate during a resource procurement or in 
the provision of transmission service).  We conclude that there is little overlap between the roles 
of such company-specific market monitors and the likely role(s) of a prospective West-wide 
market monitor. 
 
Econometric modeling of wholesale power prices 
 
Econometrics uses well-established statistical methods that can be used to model the “normal” 
relationship between wholesale power prices and a set of fundamental drivers of wholesale 
prices.  Econometric models are transparent and flexible in the sense that they can be adapted to 
whatever data happen to be available.  As part of a market monitoring function, econometric 
tools may help identify “normal” prices as one way to identify situations when abnormal price 
arise, which may deserve further investigation.   
 
To explore the feasibility of this approach, we developed several econometric models of day-
ahead on-peak power prices at two major trading hubs in the West – Palo Verde and Mid-
Columbia – as functions of the price of natural gas, a major input to the generation of electricity.  
Our models also reflect other variables that influence the supply and demand for electricity 
including: the level of end-user demand at various locations in the West, the availability of 
nuclear generating units, variables that capture the availability of hydroelectricity in the Pacific 
Northwest, and a series of variables designed to capture the regular seasonal variation in 
wholesale power prices.  For Palo Verde, we find that our relatively simple models produce 
results (i.e., parameter estimates) that are economically plausible and explain a significant 
fraction of the variation in power prices.  For example, our most complete model of Palo Verde 
prices explains over 90 percent of the variation in price (expressed as (log) price). 
 
Our models establish a benchmark that can be used to identify outlier prices that are potentially 
the result of anti-competitive behavior and may warrant further investigation.  Figure ES-1 
shows the prices at Palo Verde predicted by one of our models, along with a standard range of 
prices above and below our price estimates (i.e., a three standard-error band around the 
predictions of the model).  The blue dots are outliers that fall outside of these bands.  The three 
standard-error criterion for identifying outliers is quite forgiving, so we identify relatively few 
outliers.  On investigating these outliers, we were able to link them to well-defined events – such 
as the outages of major coal units – that are not captured by variables in our model. 
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Figure ES-1. Palo Verde  predicted prices, 3-standard error bands, and outliers 
 
Our econometric models of Mid-Columbia prices raised a number of technical challenges.  
Several of the parameter estimates produced by our models are not economically plausible or do 
not have the expected sign, suggesting problems in model specification.  In particular, the 
models do not capture adequately the effect of the spring runoff on wholesale prices.  This 
suggests that if econometric models were actually used for market monitoring, more attention to 
the unique dynamics of hydroelectricity in the Pacific Northwest would be required. 
 
Econometric analyses must be implemented and interpreted with care.  For example, the 
specification of the exact functional form of an econometric equation can be guided by good 
econometric practice and economic theory, but is ultimately more art than science.  In addition, 
the benchmark prices that are predicted by the models are only as “normal” as the data from 
which the models are estimated.  If the models are estimated on data from a period in which 
prices were consistently supra-competitive, then the benchmark prices will also be above 
competitive levels.  Further, there are subtle issues related to the specification of the geographic 
markets being analyzed when the geographic scope of electricity markets can change due to 
transmission congestion.  Despite these problems, we view the econometric approach as a 
feasible and potentially fruitful approach to market monitoring in the West. 
 
Production cost modeling 
 
We also explored the use of production cost models for market monitoring in the West.  
Production cost models are detailed simulations of the operation of power systems, including 
operating constraints on generating units and transmission constraints.  Their complexity is both 
a blessing and a curse for market monitoring.  On the one hand, they capture in great detail the 
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types of real-world physical constraints that other types of analyses may only be able to capture 
more crudely.  Also, these results have been used in utility and regulatory contexts for decades 
and are familiar tools. On the other hand, they are somewhat “black box” in nature, require 
extremely detailed data and are time- and resource-intensive to run and maintain. 
 
We discuss two modes of using production cost models for market monitoring.  First, we 
examine the possibility of updating model inputs and running models on a daily or similar basis 
so that the simulations reflect current system conditions.  We conclude that this approach is 
likely to be extremely costly at best and infeasible at worst.  Second, we consider the usefulness 
of production cost simulations based on a few discrete scenarios for understanding observed 
prices.  The idea is that if the simulations cover a sufficiently long time period and/or sufficiently 
diverse conditions, they will contain valid proxies for observed conditions at any given point in 
time. 
 
We test this idea using variations on a set of simulations that were developed originally by the 
Seams Steering Group – Western Interconnection (SSG-WI) to support long-run, electric system 
planning efforts.  We conclude that these specific simulations produce prices and price-patterns 
that bear little resemblance to observed prices and hence are of limited usefulness for assessing 
current market conditions.  The relationship between the prices produced by the simulations and 
observed prices for one location is shown in Figure ES-2. This figure displays simulated market 
heat-rates (i.e., ratios of the power price to the gas price), by month for Arizona for a range of 
gas prices, and observed market heat-rates for three recent years for Palo Verde, a trading hub in 
Arizona.  The simulated market heat rates are generally significantly below the observed market 
heat rates and lack any of the regular seasonal patterns that are present in the observed market 
heat rates.  
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Figure ES-2. Observed and simulated on-peak market heat-rates (PV) 
 
A comparison of actual and simulated market heat-rates for Mid-Columbia shows even wider 
discrepancies between the level and pattern of simulated and actual market heat-rates.  In 
particular, the simulations do not seem to capture the dramatic dip in power prices that occurs 
during the spring runoff in the Pacific Northwest. 
 
We fully acknowledge that the simulations were originally developed to model a future year 
(2008) and contain resources and transmission additions that do not currently exist.  Hence, it is 
not surprising that they produce prices that are unrealistic by current standards.  It is an open 
question whether a parsimonious set of production cost model simulations that accurately reflect 
current supply and demand fundamentals could be useful for market monitoring.  Based on what 
we do know and observe about the “black box” nature of production cost models in general, and 
the difficulty inherent in reconciling the extent of optimization in production cost models with 
real-world operating practices, we believe the answer is “no.” 
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1. Introduction 
This report explores some approaches to wholesale power market monitoring in the Western 
Interconnection outside of California and Alberta.  By market monitoring, we mean the 
systematic analysis of market behavior and outcomes to identify behavior that is inconsistent 
with well-functioning competitive markets.  Such behavior may include the exercise of market 
power, e.g., withholding supply from the market in order to raise price.1  
 
In the U.S., Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) with “Day 2” functions2 generally 
have dedicated market monitoring functions.  The market monitors may be RTO staff members, 
independent consultants, or both.  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) treats 
applications to sell at market-based rates from suppliers in markets with the full complement of 
“Day 2” functions, including formal market monitoring, more leniently than other applications.3    
 
While we fully acknowledge the wide range of views on the costs and benefits of RTOs, it is 
simply a fact that market monitoring in RTOs is easier—primarily because of the voluminous 
amounts of data produced in the centralized “Day 2” markets administered by RTOs.  RTO 
market monitors typically have access to data on the hourly operations of individual units, their 
bids into various centrally administered, bid-based markets —including markets for both energy 
and ancillary services, estimates of units’ variable costs, hourly prices at multiple locations and 
for multiple products, detailed information on transmission constraints, and other data not 
typically available in non-Day 2 RTOs and other bilateral markets, such as exist in the Western 
United States. 
 
Because of the absence of publicly and/or centrally collected data for the Western U.S. wholesale 
power markets outside of California, it is generally infeasible to replicate the analyses performed 
by market monitors in Day 2 RTOs.4   Therefore, it is necessary to approach market monitoring 
in a different way than has been done in organized markets.   
 
                                                 
1 In many markets, in addition to monitoring current market outcomes and behavior, Market Monitors also play a 
constructive role in designing more efficient market rules and institutions.  This second role is not the focus of this 
report. 
2 In the industry parlance of RTOs with different sets of functions, a so-called “Day One” RTO includes the 
following types of grid operator functions: open-access transmission service, congestion management, ancillary 
services and interregional planning. By contrast, a so-called “Day Two” RTO would involve all the functions of a 
Day One RTO as well as operation of a bid-based, security-constrained market with economic dispatch, locational 
pricing, and financial transmission rights or capacity markets. http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/press-
releases/2004/2004-4/10-06-04.asp . 
3For example, a current FERC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-
meet/051806/E-2.pdf), which reflects recent de facto FERC policy, suggests that sellers located in RTO markets 
with established market monitoring protocols may limit their analysis to the geographic market defined by the 
footprint of the relevant RTO in their market-based rate filings.  (¶ 25)   In contrast, suppliers outside of RTOs are 
frequently required to examine multiple geographic markets.  Similarly, the market-based rate filings of suppliers in 
RTO markets can reflect explicitly the market power mitigation measures to which the suppliers are subject.  (¶ 60). 
4 For examples of the analyses performed by the CAISO market monitor, see 
http://www.caiso.com/docs/2005/01/13/2005011316200513508.html. 
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Our attempt to do so is the subject of this report.  In section 2, we describe the types of wholesale 
power markets that exist in the West outside of California and Alberta, along with the type of 
information available about the performance of such markets.  In sections 3 and 4, we review 
some types of analyses that might be used for market monitoring in the absence of RTO-style 
data and the data that might be used in such analyses.  In section 5, we present results of an 
exploratory analysis that could be conducted by a West-wide market monitor, an econometric 
analysis of bilateral prices.  In section 6, we discuss the results of a detailed production cost 
simulation of the Western power market.  Production cost simulations produce the types of 
detailed information that are typically available to market monitors in Day 2 RTO markets.  
Ultimately, we are unable to draw firm conclusions based on the results of the simulations 
because the conditions modeled in the simulations — which were not originally intended for 
market monitoring — were quite different from current and recent historical conditions. In 
section 7, we summarize the activities of market monitors retained by several individual utilities 
in the Western region.  Generally, the roles of these “company-specific” market monitors are 
very different from the roles of market monitors in RTOs.  While market monitors in RTOs 
review competitive conditions in short-term wholesale markets, assess market rules, and evaluate 
market structure, company-specific market monitors generally oversee long-term wholesale 
procurement with an emphasis on limiting affiliate abuse. Finally, we offer some concluding 
remarks in Section 8. 
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2. Wholesale power markets in the West outside of California 
Wholesale markets in the Western Interconnection outside of California and Alberta are different 
than organized markets with RTOs in at least four main ways.  First and foremost, the structure 
of the market is not an RTO structure, so there is no centralized West-wide unit commitment and 
dispatch. Consequently, the information that RTOs collect in the process of performing unit 
commitment and dispatch, such as unit-specific bid information, are simply not available for 
market monitoring.  In addition, non-RTO markets do not produce the highly geographically and 
temporally disaggregated prices that are the result of a market-based centralized unit-
commitment and dispatch.  As FERC has noted: 
 
What information is available to regulators (and when) depends largely on the 
structure of the market. Locational marginal, day-ahead, and real-time pricing, 
along with capacity and ancillary services within RTO markets, are almost 
entirely transparent and make much information available in real time. Such 
transparency rests on standardized operations and large, centralized mechanisms 
to collect and disseminate the information. By contrast, most natural gas markets 
and bilateral electric markets provide far less detailed information, depending 
instead on trade publications to provide price indices.5 
 
Second, in the absence of RTO markets, there is a substantial amount of trade in the West 
through bilateral markets.  This is relatively well understood, and supported with information 
about the extent of bilateral trading in wholesale power markets.  Volumes on the 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), an electronic platform for trading standardized natural gas, 
power, and other energy-related contracts, offers one measure of such trading activity outside of 
RTO-mediated markets.  For example, ICE volumes for on-peak deliveries to Palo Verde, the 
most liquid of several hubs in the Southwest, averaged 20,953 MW in 2004, relative to annual 
load in the entire Southwest (excluding California) of 180,154 GWh.6  Similarly, ICE volumes 
for on-peak deliveries to Mid-Columbia, the most liquid hub in the Pacific Northwest, averaged 
23,636 MW relative to annual load in the entire Pacific Northwest of 223,148 GWh.7  In 
contrast, for New York, an RTO market, ICE volumes for on-peak delivery to the most liquid 
delivery point (Zone A) averaged only 3,445 MW in 2004 compared to annual net generation of 
160,210 GWh — or approximately one-fifth the level of on-peak deliveries of ICE volumes as is 
exhibited at Palo Verde and Mid-Columbia.8 
 
Third, many U.S. utilities in the West outside of California are essentially vertically integrated, 
obviating to a large degree the need to purchase from wholesale markets to serve load.  To the 
extent that utilities are short or long, they frequently address these imbalances through long-term 
contracts, rather than through the shorter-term transactions that are typically the focus of market 
                                                 
5 FERC (2005), p. 36. 
6 Ibid., p. 121. 
7 Ibid., p. 99. 
8 We divide on-peak deliveries of ICE volumes in a particular region by the total annual load in the same region for 
this comparison. 
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monitoring.  Even when they do trade in short-term markets (as indicated above), it is typically 
through bilateral contracts, since there are not bid-based, centralized balancing markets such as 
provided by Day 2 RTOs. 
 
Fourth, non-FERC-jurisdictional entities, such as Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and 
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), play an important role in Western wholesale 
power markets.9  They are not subject to the same reporting requirements as FERC-jurisdictional 
entities — such as reporting wholesale transaction in the Electric Quarterly Reports discussed 
below.  This lends yet another layer of opacity to Western wholesale power markets. 
 
 
                                                 
9 FERC (2005) states that BPA “meets approximately 44% of the region’s (i.e., the Pacific Northwest’s) firm energy 
supply from resources under its control.” (p. 99) 
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3. Analytic Techniques 
Even in the absence of the detailed data available in Day 2 RTOs, there are a variety of analytic 
techniques that could be applied to market monitoring in the West outside of California and 
Alberta.  This section provides a brief overview of these techniques. 
 
3.1 Supply Stack 
The simplest approach to market monitoring involves constructing a competitive benchmark 
using a simple generation supply stack.  This approach entails stacking the resources available to 
meet load in a region in economic merit order to form a supply curve.  The competitive 
benchmark price for a given period is then determined at the point on this curve corresponding to 
the period’s load adjusted for certain ancillary service requirements.  Divergences between 
competitive benchmark prices and observed prices may be attributable to the exercise of market 
power.  This approach was applied to the U.K. market by Wolfram (1999).  Several authors 
including Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) have applied a 
similar approach to California. 
 
There are limits to the supply stack approach.10  First, it tends to ignore some of the geographic 
characteristics of wholesale power markets.  It may be well-suited to markets with relatively 
simple network configurations, such as California’s, but it is poorly suited to analyzing the 
exercise of market power across broad regions with internal transmission constraints that bind 
only intermittently.  To the extent that transmission constraints are reflected in supply stack 
analysis, they are represented crudely and in a way that relies on data that may not be readily 
available outside of RTO markets.  For example, the supply stack analyses of California 
differentiate between resources internal to California and imports.  In the case of at least the 
Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak paper (BBW), the representation of imports is based on bids 
into one of the markets that was administered by the California ISO.  These bid data were 
confidential when the authors wrote their paper.  BBW’s analysis also relies on other 
confidential data, such as data on must-run and hydro generation. 
 
In addition, supply stack approaches ignore operating constraints in a way that tends to 
understate prices during on-peak periods and overstate prices in off-peak periods relative to the 
prices that would be realized in a perfectly competitive market.  Ramping constraints limit the 
ability of certain generators to reach maximum output during peak periods as quickly as the 
supply stack models assume. During the night, many generators run at minimum generation 
levels in order to avoid startup costs and to be available to meet load the following day, whereas 
supply stack models tend to assume that they are completely off-line.  
 
3.2 Production Cost Models 
Using production cost models, such as Prosym and GE-MAPS, to develop competitive 
benchmark wholesale electricity prices might address many of the problems associated with 
supply stack models.  For example, production cost models can handle transmission and 
operating constraints, and represent the relationship between loads and resources in great detail.  
                                                 
10 See Harvey and Hogan (2002) for a more detailed critique of the supply stack approach.   
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The main downsides associated with production cost models for market monitoring is that they 
are expensive to obtain, set up and maintain, and probably too complicated to run very often 
unless a model has been taken in-house by a market monitoring organization with staff trained 
and dedicated to the function.  In particular, if a production cost model is to be used for market 
monitoring (as opposed to its use for long-term planning purposes, for example), the data that are 
used in the model must reflect current conditions, not expected or average conditions as are 
typically reflected in such models.  Updating the detailed inputs of a production cost model to 
reflect current fuel prices, loads, and plant availability presumably would require a multi-person 
full time staff with access to information about changing conditions in the market on a current 
basis. 
 
In addition, production-cost models have a tendency to “over optimize,” i.e., they tend to 
simulate unit commitment and dispatch that is more efficient than can be achieved in reality.  In 
part, this is because they assume a greater degree of foresight about market conditions than 
control area operators and market participants typically have, especially in non-RTO 
environments.  For example, models may assume that generators know with certainty what loads 
are likely to be several days out.  In addition, they tend to assume implicitly a greater degree of 
coordination between separate control areas, such as exist in the West, than could be or has been 
realized.11 
 
3.3 Econometric Models 
Econometric models are a third approach.  They can be used to develop statistical relationships 
between wholesale prices and readily observable factors that influence prices, such as fuel prices 
and loads.  Prices that deviate in a statistically significant manner from the prices predicted by 
econometric models may merit further investigation and indicate the exercise of market power. 
 
To be useful in a market monitoring context, econometric models must be specified and 
interpreted with care.  For example, in order to identify anomalous prices, it is necessary to make 
assumptions about what constitute “normal” prices.  If the model that establishes the normal 
relationship between prices and the fundamental drivers of prices is estimated on data from a 
period in which prices were high, perhaps due to the exercise of market power, then subsequent 
high prices will look normal according to the model.  
 
The econometric approach has three main virtues.  First, it can be tailored to whatever data are 
readily available.  Relatively crude data can be used to estimate relatively simple models while 
more detailed data can be used to estimate more complicated models.  Second, it provides a 
framework for thinking about the precision of models and the expected frequency of large 
deviations from established relationships between prices, on the one hand, and supply and 
demand fundamentals, on the other hand, even in the absence of the exercise of market power.  
Third, econometric models are used in a variety of contexts.  Consequently, there is a deep base 
of knowledge among practitioners with respect to methodological issues, strengths, weaknesses, 
                                                 
11 This coordination is one argument that is invoked frequently in favor of geographically broad RTOs (Midwest 
ISO 2006). 
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and so forth.  As such, they tend to be relatively transparent, with norms about reporting statistics 
to help guide interpretation of their results. 
 
The FERC staff recently has attempted to develop the types of econometric models that we are 
discussing here.12  Some  ISO/RTOs that have the data to perform more sophisticated analyses, 
also use simple econometric models to identify areas for more detailed analysis.13  Similar 
models have also been used in regulatory proceedings.14  In section 5, we develop some simple 
econometric models of wholesale power prices in the West and believe that this approach has 
promise for market monitoring in non-RTO markets.   
 
3.4 Game-theoretic Simulations 
The preceding three sections discussed methods for developing estimates of competitive 
benchmark prices.  However, they provide little insight into the range of outcomes that might be 
realized if market participants behave anti-competitively, using strategic behavior to affect 
prices.  In order to get a sense for the range of outcomes in such circumstances, it is necessary to 
model strategic behavior directly.  Models of strategic behavior are based on the same types of 
data as supply stack and production cost models.  They range from the types of comparatively 
simple, single-area Cournot models developed and promoted by Bushnell and his co-authors,15 to 
models that allow for a broader range of strategic behavior16 or allow for both strategic behavior 
and transmission constraints.17   For tractability, these models radically simplify strategic 
behavior.  For example, Cournot models assume that each strategic supplier decides how much 
to produce in each period conditional on what he expects other suppliers to provide.  The models 
attempt to identify “Nash equilibria” in which each supplier is maximizing profits conditional on 
his expectations about the behavior of other suppliers and each supplier’s expectations about 
other suppliers’ behavior are in fact consistent with observed behavior.  Other models assume 
that suppliers will bid linear or other “supply curves” that express their willingness to supply 
different quantities at different prices.  Models that incorporate the potential for transmission 
congestion can become unwieldy.  One common assumption in the literature is to assume that 
suppliers do not fully internalize the effect of their own behavior on transmission congestion.  
Few if any models of strategic behavior address transmission and other operating constraints at 
the level of engineering detail of production cost models. These models can be difficult to solve 
and are sensitive to assumptions.  As the authors of one paper note, “…it has been well known 
                                                 
12 See Yoo and  Meroney (2005). 
13 See chapter 5 of ISO-New England (2003) as an example. 
14 In the New Jersey proceeding reviewing the Exelon/PSEG merger, both Petitioners and Intervenors used 
econometric models to quantify the benefits in terms of lower wholesale prices due to the increased availability of 
nuclear units that may result from the merger (Schnitzer 2005).  
15 For example, see Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2004), Bushnell ( 2003), and Borenstein and  Bushnell (1999). 
Cournot models are based on quantity competition. This is especially relevant to electricity markets where capacity 
constraints limit quantities both in the long run and in the short run through unit commitment. 
 
16 See Baldick, Grant, and Kahn (2004). These models reflect the actual form of electricity market bidding, where 
suppliers offer price and quantity schedules, but are more difficult to solve than Cournot models.  
17 Neuhoff, et al. (2005).  
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that structural and behavioral assumptions in oligopoly models affect the results. We have shown 
that even within a family of models (Cournot), assumptions concerning transmission can 
dramatically affect the solutions of electricity market models.”18 
 
3.5 Analyses of Physical Withholding 
Another approach involves examining market behavior directly at the supplier, plant, or unit 
levels.  Many forms of anticompetitive behavior effectively involve withdrawing capacity from 
the market.  Using data on the operation of units, it is possible to infer whether units that 
plausibly could have operated profitably did not.19  Any such analysis must carefully account for 
all of the operating costs of a unit and legitimate forced and maintenance outages. Determining 
whether outages are legitimate requires special effort. During the 2000-2001 Western electricity 
crisis there were several investigations of such issues. These investigations reveal how much 
complexity and judgment can be required in these cases.20 
 
Outside of RTOs, the main source of data on generating unit-level operations is EPA’s 
Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) data.  These data are only available for large 
steam units and with a significant time lag (e.g., one year or longer after an event occurs).  
Because of the time lag in their release, any analysis of the CEMS data are not well-suited to 
near real-time market monitoring, but may provide useful detail about the market months or year 
after the fact. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Joskow and Kahn (2002) include an example of such an analysis.  
20 See FERC (2001a). The background facts on this matter were not released by FERC at the time of this settlement. 
Subsequently this information became available as the result of a Freedom of Information Act request; see “Non-
Public Appendix to Order Directing Williams Energy Marketing & Trading Company and AES Southland, Inc, to 
Show Cause,” Docket No. IN01-03-001, available at http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ferc/ 
williamsaes111502osc.pdf . Other investigations include CPUC (2002), and FERC (2001b). 
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4. Data 
In this section, we describe the types of information and data that could be used for market 
monitoring in the West. 
 
4.1 Bilateral Price Data 
The commercial price-reporting services such as Platts, Bloomberg, and Dow Jones report price 
indices based on averages of bilateral transaction prices reported for major trading hubs in the 
West.  The most widely quoted prices are for standard day-ahead products, such as sixteen hour 
on-peak strips, but prices for hourly products are becoming increasingly available.21  The quoted 
prices are available on a near real-time basis.  Because index prices are based on the voluntary 
reporting of transaction prices, they lack the transparency and verifiability of clearing prices 
determined in Day 2 RTO markets.  Even so, such bilateral prices have become increasingly 
reliable due to reforms implemented in reaction to alleged attempts to manipulate index prices 
through reporting false transactions that occurred during the 2000-2001 Western electricity 
crisis.  On its own and then with the new authority that it was granted in the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005, FERC has issued enforceable rules prohibiting the filing of false information and 
toughened the standards that the price-reporting services must apply to the transactions that they 
use to construct index prices in order for the index prices to be used in FERC-jurisdictional 
tariffs.22  In addition, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has investigated 
vigorously many instances of false reporting to the price-reporting services, presumably leading 
to improved reliability of data reporting.23 
 
4.2 Hourly Load Data 
Electric utilities’ hourly loads from FERC Form 714 are available with approximately the same 
spatial resolution as the hourly loads published by RTOs. While the RTO data tend to be 
available on a near real-time basis, however, the FERC form 714 data are only available with a 
lag of a year or more. For example, the 2005 data were not yet available as of May 2006. In 
order to be useful for market monitoring, data similar to the FERC Form 714 data would need to 
be published and/or made available for this purpose on a much-more timely basis. We do not 
think that the release of these data closer to real-time would raise genuine and new 
confidentiality concerns. If a West-wide market monitoring entity were established, access to 
such hourly load data on a more current basis would be useful. Hopefully access to such 
information could be negotiated. Temperature data may provide good proxies for load data and 
are available close to real time. 
 
                                                 
21 For example, see http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/?event=energyUSHourly.  
22 For example, see http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/063005/G-15.pdf and http://www.ferc.gov/whats-
new/comm-meet/111804/M-1.pdf.  Additionally, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included authority for FERC to 
issue penalties for false reporting. 
23 For example, see http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf02/opa4728-02.htm, http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf03/opa4869-
03.htm, and http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf03/opa4840-03.htm.  
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4.3 Hydro Data 
There are abundant publicly available data on hydrologic conditions in the Pacific Northwest.  
Given the importance of hydro in the Western grid as a whole and particularly the Pacific 
Northwest, these data are potentially very useful in understanding wholesale power markets in 
the West. 
 
4.3.1 Flows and Reservoir Levels 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers publishes daily data on flows of water and reservoir levels at 
various points on the Columbia and Snake rivers.  These data have been collected on a 
comparatively easy-to-use web site by the School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences at the 
University of Washington.24  From the data on flow and spill at various dams, it is possible to get 
relatively accurate estimates of the amount of hydroelectricity generation at a dam on a day, but 
this information may be difficult to use for market monitoring purposes in that it may reflect 
response to, rather than the causes of, the market conditions that a market monitor might like to 
explain.25  The data on reservoir levels — especially at upstream locations with storage, such as 
Grand Coulee — are potentially more useful for market monitoring because they are 
predetermined and hence cannot be influenced by market conditions at a point in time.  Reservoir 
levels are a good proxy for the potential to generate hydroelectricity in the future and hence the 
opportunity cost associated with generating hydroelectricity at a point in time.  In a competitive 
market, lower prices will be associated with higher storage and lower opportunity costs of hydro 
generation. 
 
4.3.2 Snow Pack 
Water can be stored behind a dam as well as in snow pack — that is, as long as temperatures at 
suitably high elevations remain sufficiently low.  The Natural Resources Conservation Service of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture collects daily data on snow pack at hundreds of sites 
throughout the West.26  Data on snow pack at sites in the relevant hydrologic basins can provide 
information about the potential to generate hydroelectricity once the snow melts. 
 
4.4 Plant Availability Data 
Outages of major generating units can influence prices.  Generators routinely report outages to 
their control area coordinators and to reliability organizations such as the North American 
Reliability Council (NERC) and its associated regional reliability councils.  In the case of data 
reported to control area operators, the data may not be published publicly at all; and for data 
reported to NERC and/or regional reliability councils, the data are publicly available only in 
highly aggregated form.  For example, WECC publishes a daily report that contains data on 
generator outages for three sub-regions of WECC, but the report does not differentiate between 
                                                 
24 http://www.cbr.washington.edu/dart/river.html   
25 High temperature at high elevations and/or rain during the spring result in runoff and consequent hydroelectric 
generation, which is essentially exogenous.  Data on temperature and rainfall might help disentangle controllable 
and non-controllable hydroelectric generation (Mitchell 2006). 
26 http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/snow/  
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forced and scheduled outages, nor does the report any disaggregation of outages with respect to 
the efficiency or fuel of the unavailable units.27  For units in California, the CAISO publishes 
daily information on unit outages that differentiates between planned and forced outages.28  In 
addition, there are commercial services that provide data on unit availability throughout the 
entire U.S. in real-time.29 
 
Public data on the availability of nuclear units are more readily available.  Each morning, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, publishes a report on the availability of all nuclear generating 
units in the U.S. on that day.30 
 
4.5 Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) data 
As discussed above, data on the hourly operation of large steam units are available from the 
EPA’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System data.  These data are not available for all units 
and are published with a substantial lag. 
 
4.6 Electric Quarterly Report (EQR) data 
FERC has increased the reporting requirements for sales made by generators and marketers 
pursuant to FERC-granted Market-Based Rate (MBR) authority.  Such sales cover most 
wholesale electric transactions entered into in recent years.  MBR sellers are required to report to 
FERC on a quarterly basis essentially all of their transactions, ranging from short-term imbalance 
energy transactions to multi-year capacity and energy contracts.  FERC makes the data publicly 
available.31  Because these data are published with a lag of at least a few months, they cannot be 
used for near real-time market monitoring.  To the extent that a substantial fraction of short-term 
transactions in the West are for standard products delivered to major trading hubs, these EQR 
data provide relatively little incremental information about prices relative to index prices that are 
published without a lag.  However, the EQR data can be used to validate index prices after the 
fact and to glean information about prices for transactions beyond the standard products followed 
by the price-reporting services. 
 
                                                 
27 The report is available on 
http://www.wecc.biz/index.php?module=pagesetter&tid=8&pubcnt=14&orderby=core.created:desc. 
28 http://www.caiso.com/unitstatus/index.html   
29 http://www.genscape.com/na/data_us_morning.shtml  
30 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/ps.html   
31 http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/eqr/data.asp  
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5. Test of an Econometric Model of Bilateral Power Prices in the West 
In this section, we investigate the usefulness of publicly available data for West-wide market 
monitoring using one particular analytic technique from among those described above.  
Specifically, we attempt to develop econometric models of a commonly traded product — day-
ahead on-peak strips — at two large trading hubs in the West: Mid-Columbia and Palo Verde. 
 
5.1 Functional Form of an Econometric Model 
Specifying the functional form of an econometric model is essential to using this technique — 
and inherently subjective.  Functional form describes the mathematical relationship between the 
variable of interest, i.e., the dependent variable, and the factors that influence the dependent 
variable, i.e., the independent variables.   A simplified functional form of an econometric model 
is shown below, with “X” showing the independent variable, “Y” denoting the dependent 
variable, and “a” and “b” as the coefficients that describe the relationship between X and Y.   
 
Y = a + bX 
 
Numerical methods are used to find the coefficients that best fit the data.  These numerical 
methods also produce estimates of the precision of the estimated coefficients and measures of 
how much of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the econometric model.  
 
At a minimum, the functional form of an econometric model should be tied at least loosely to 
economic theory.  In competitive power markets, prices are related to the marginal cost of 
generation, i.e., the incremental cost of the last unit required to serve load (and reserve 
requirements).  As load and as fuel prices rise, the cost of the marginal generating unit rises as 
well.  If the relative costs of different fuels change, in some cases, the identity of the marginal 
unit may change as well.  In addition, as the quantity of electricity generated at a point in time 
increases, the price of power should increase as less efficient units using more expensive fuels 
become marginal. 
 
Our understanding of the relationship between wholesale electricity prices and the marginal cost 
of production leads us to select a functional form that is non-linear, namely one in which the 
natural logarithm of price is explained by a series of variables.  We estimate models of the 
natural logarithm of price rather than the level of price for several reasons.  First, supply curves 
in most wholesale power markets tend to be non-linear.  An increase in load tends to result in 
much larger price increases when prices are already high than if they are comparatively low.  
Estimating a model of log price allows us to capture some of this non-linearity.  Second, during 
on-peak hours in the Western power market, natural gas is almost always the fuel that is being 
used by the last power plant dispatched to meet load requirements (i.e., gas is “on the margin”).  
The relationship between power prices and gas prices in a market in which gas is always on the 
margin is inherently log-log.  If gas is on the margin and the market is competitive, the clearing 
price is the product of the marginal generating unit’s heat rate (its efficiency in converting gas to 
power) and the gas price. In other words: 
 
power price = marginal heat rate * gas price 
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Taking logs of both sides yields: 
 
log(power price) = log(marginal heat rate) + log(gas price) 
 
Our econometric models are based on this simple relationship.  The challenge is developing data 
that help us identify the marginal heat rate.  We will discuss some of the factors that might 
determine the marginal heat rate below.  Ultimately, we estimate versions of the model including 
some or all of the variables in the following specification: 
 
 
1 2
3
log(powerprice) log(gasprice) load
availability of nuclear plants+
*hydro conditions+
*seasonal and day-of-week dummies+e
= α + β + β +
β
δ
γ
 
 
where, e is an error term reflecting the portion of the power price not explained by the variables  
included in our model.  Conditional on a certain gas-fired unit being marginal, an increase in the 
gas price raises the price of power.  The other variables in the model essentially determine the 
efficiency of the marginal unit.  For example, if load is higher, the efficiency of the marginal unit 
is likely to be lower and prices higher.  Conversely, if hydro and nuclear generation is more 
readily available, the efficiency of the marginal unit is likely to be higher and prices lower.  In 
some specifications, we also include dummy variables designed to capture regular variation in 
power prices over the course of a year and during a week.  Below, we discuss the impact and 
interpretation of each of these factors in our model. 
 
We also must be mindful of the fact that natural gas is not necessarily always on the margin.  For 
example, peak prices cover a 16-hour period.  Coal may be marginal in at least some hours of the 
peak period.  Under these conditions, gas prices should not influence clearing prices during those 
hours.  In this case, our specification above would bias our estimated coefficient for the gas price 
downwards.  This can be explained in the following way.  In an all-gas electric system, a 1% 
increase in the gas price should lead to a 1% increase in wholesale power prices under all 
conditions.  In other words, the elasticity of the power price with respect to the gas price should 
be unity.  To the extent that the gas price only influences power prices under certain conditions, 
the estimated elasticity of the power price with respect to the gas price should be less than unity.  
 
5.2 Treating Issues of Geography in the Western Power Markets 
One of the most challenging aspects of the analysis of wholesale power markets is the fact that 
geographic markets are transient, and depend on complex real-time relationships among loads 
and generation in different locations and power flows around the system.  For example, under 
certain conditions, the entire West may behave as essentially one integrated market with minimal 
price differences between different locations. This would typically occur when there are no or 
minimal transmission constraints that cause out-of-merit order dispatch of plants to maintain 
secure system operations. Under other conditions, transmission constraints may limit the flows of 
electricity between regions, require some units to be dispatched out of merit order, produce price 
differences among regions, and hence limit price convergence. 
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In our scoping analyses, we have adopted a practical and relatively expansive view of geographic 
markets that we believe reflects the empirical reality of power flows and trade in the West.  We 
assume that supply and demand conditions in California influence prices at both Mid-Columbia 
and Palo Verde, but that factors in the Desert Southwest do not have a direct impact on prices in 
the Pacific Northwest and vice versa.  These assumptions reflect the fact that the Pacific 
Northwest and Desert Southwest are both connected by major transmission lines to California.  
However, the direct connections between the Pacific Northwest and Desert Southwest are much 
less robust.  In section 5.7, we present some attempts to address the potential for transmission 
congestion in the econometric analysis. 
 
5.3 Sample Period  
Our analysis focuses on the 2002-2004 calendar years.  Econometric models are only valid to the 
extent that major structural changes can be quantified and captured in the models.  Consequently, 
we have chosen to focus on a period of comparatively stable market institutions and supply and 
demand conditions following the Western electricity crisis of 2000-2001. 
 
5.4 Selection of Variables and Sources of Data 
In this section, we discuss the sources of each of the variables included in our econometric 
model. 
 
5.4.1 On-peak Power Prices 
We estimate models of standard day-ahead, on-peak sixteen-hour strips of power for delivery to 
the Mid-Columbia and Palo Verde trading hubs and rely on the index prices compiled by 
Bloomberg.  In our experience, these prices are consistent with the index prices of other 
publishers, such as Dow Jones and Platts. 
 
5.4.2 Natural Gas Prices 
We use gas prices from Natural Gas Intelligence (NGI) for a variety of locations in the West.  
Because we do not model or know the specific location of the marginal gas-fired resource in 
each period, we use gas prices that, we expect, more often than not, correspond to the location of 
the marginal resource.  For example, we use a price reported for the Malin location, in our Mid-
Columbia regression.  Malin is close to the California-Oregon border and the Malin price tends 
to track prices throughout the Pacific Northwest as well as prices in Northern California.32  For 
Palo Verde, we use a Southern California border price.  This price overstates the price of gas for 
generators in Nevada and Arizona.  Under the types of conditions experienced during the 2000-
2001 electricity crisis, when prices for delivery into Southern California were significantly 
higher than for delivery to other nearby locations, the overstatement may be significant.  Given 
that we estimate our models on post-crisis data, we think that Southern California border price is 
a reasonable proxy for gas prices in both the Desert Southwest and Southern California. 
                                                 
32 We are familiar with other studies of Northwest power prices that use Sumas or AECO prices. 
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5.4.3 Hourly Load Data 
Next to fuel prices, perhaps the biggest driver of wholesale power prices is load level.  For the 
regressions in our analysis, it is sufficient to use load measures that are reasonably highly 
correlated with aggregate loads throughout the relevant region, i.e., it is not necessary to 
construct a comprehensive measure of regional load.  We construct daily average loads for three 
areas:  a large utility in the Pacific Northwest (PacifiCorp which includes both the PP&L and 
Utah Power portions of PacifiCorp)33; a large utility in the Desert Southwest (Arizona Public 
Service); and the California ISO control area.  For each utility or control area, we used the hourly 
loads reported on FERC Form 714. 
 
5.4.4 Month, Day-of-week, and Annual Dummies 
Wholesale power prices exhibit certain regular temporal patterns.  We include a set of “dummy 
variables” designed to capture this regular temporal variation.34  For example, prices tend to be 
higher in the summer than in the winter.  We include a set of month dummies to capture regular 
seasonal variation in prices.  In addition, because so-called day-ahead prices are not always 
literally for delivery the next day, there may be variations in prices due to the day of the week.  
For example, during most weeks, the “day-ahead” package traded on Thursday is for delivery on 
both Friday and Saturday.  Because the price reflects an average of weekend and non-weekend 
prices, the package price tends to be lower than what a Friday-only price might be and above 
what a Saturday-only price might be.  Finally, we include a set of year dummies to reflect the 
fact that factors that change with lower frequency, such as the stock of generating capacity, may 
be changing the relationship between the variables that we include in our model and price. 
 
5.4.5 Hydropower Conditions 
Hydro conditions are a large driver of prices in the Pacific Northwest.  The difficulty in 
modeling hydro is that while its direct costs are low, generating hydroelectricity entails 
opportunity costs.  Using stored water to generate hydroelectricity today precludes using it in the 
future.  To the extent that the water that is stored behind dams or in snow that has yet to melt is 
more abundant, the opportunity cost of water is lower, and more hydroelectricity is likely to be 
supplied at any given price.  We capture the amount of water in storage using two different 
measures. 
 
First, we model reservoir levels at Grand Coulee.  We believe that Grand Coulee reservoir levels 
are a good measure of the availability of hydroelectricity from the entire Columbia River system 
because there is a large amount of storage behind Grand Coulee and it is upstream of most of the 
largest dams on the Columbia River.  We measure reservoir levels as the ratio of the reservoir 
                                                 
33  It may not be optimal to use a load variable that reflects Utah Power load in our analysis.  Utah Power is more 
closely integrated with the Desert Southwest than the Pacific Northwest.  Future work should probably use a broader 
aggregate of Pacific Northwest load or use the load of a different Pacific Northwest utility as a proxy for load 
throughout the region (Mitchell 2006). 
34 A “dummy” or “indicator” variable captures the fact that an observation meets a certain specific logical condition.  
For example, a “June dummy” would be one for all observations corresponding to June delivery dates and zero 
otherwise. 
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level on a specific day to the ten-year average reservoir level for the relevant date.35  In effect, by 
specifying the variable in this way, we de-seasonalize the data to account for the regular 
variation in reservoir levels, i.e., the depletion of the reservoir over the winter and spring, the fill 
during the spring and early summer run-off, and relatively flat reservoir levels during the fall. 
 
Second, we model snow pack levels at one location in the Cascades.36  This measure of snow 
pack is a proxy for the snow pack throughout the Columbia River basin.  Our raw data contain 
information on snow pack in water-inch equivalents.  The measure that we include in our 
regression is the log of the difference between the level of snow pack on a specific date and the 
five-year average for the same date.37  We use this measure rather than a ratio of actual to 
average snow pack, because snow pack naturally declines virtually to zero each year in this area.  
A ratio of actual to average snow pack gives undue weight to small deviations in snow pack in 
the late spring/early summer when most of the snow has melted. 
 
5.4.6 Outages of Nuclear Generators 
Outages of major base-load generators are akin to load in terms of their effect on the efficiency 
of the marginal unit in a given hour.  An outage of a generating unit that would otherwise run in 
merit order necessitates the use of higher cost resources to meet load.   We have chosen to use 
nuclear outages as a measure of availability of base-load generators, since nuclear plants almost 
always operate in base-load mode everywhere they operate. 
 
To reflect nuclear unit outages in our model, we use data from the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to compute a measure of the daily availability of nuclear plants throughout the 
West.  We compute nuclear availability for three distinct geographic locations (the Pacific 
Northwest, the Desert Southwest, and California), just as we did for load data.  The Pacific 
Northwest measure reflects the availability of the Columbia nuclear power plant.  The Desert 
Southwest measure reflects the availability of the Palo Verde nuclear plant.  The California 
measure reflects the availability of the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear plants.  In 
aggregate the measures reflect the availability of all nuclear plants in the West. 
 
In theory, outages of other baseload units, such as many coal units, have the same effect on 
prices as outages of nuclear units.  As discussed above, data on nuclear unit outages are publicly 
available while data on outages of non-nuclear units outside of California are commercially 
available, but not necessarily in the public domain.  We have not attempted to obtain these data 
and incorporate them in our analysis. 
 
It is potentially important to differentiate changes in nuclear plant availability due to planned 
nuclear outages from those due to forced outages.  Because planned outages are anticipated, 
generation owners and/or ISO’s schedule them to occur during low-price periods and when other 
major units are not down for maintenance, minimizing the effect of the lost output on price.  
                                                 
35 The ten-year averages are available from the University of Washington’s DART site discussed above in Footnote 
24. 
36 The location is Hart’s Pass. 
37 We construct five-year averages ourselves. 
A Regional Approach to Market Monitoring in the West    
   17
Because virtually all planned outages occur in the spring and fall, for each geographic measure 
of nuclear availability we include three different temporal measures, a summer measure, a winter 
measure, and a spring/fall or shoulder measure. 
 
5.5 Results 
We estimate separate regressions for Mid-Columbia and Palo Verde because these are two of the 
largest trading hubs in the West and in sufficiently different parts of the West that different 
factors are likely to drive prices at the two locations.  We show the results of the ordinary-least 
squares regressions38 for these two locations in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.39 
 
Before describing the results in technical detail, we make the following observations.  In both the 
Palo Verde and Mid-Columbia regressions, a few key variables — notably, natural gas fuel 
prices and loads — go a long ways towards explaining wholesale power prices.  Other factors, 
such as nuclear unit outages, have statistically significant effects on prices, but they occur 
sufficiently rarely that adding variables that capture these factors to the model does little to 
explain variation in wholesale power prices over long periods of time — even though they may 
be important to understanding the behavior of prices at a specific point in time. 
 
The results for Palo Verde are shown in Table 1.  In general, the factors that we hypothesized 
should influence power prices do in fact influence power prices.  In addition, the magnitudes of 
the impacts of different factors on power prices are economically plausible.  Finally, the models 
seem to explain a large fraction of the overall variation in power prices.  This gives us some 
confidence that the model is well specified. 
 
Looking at the results in more detail, the first column of Table 1 shows the results of a univariate 
regression of the log power price on the log natural gas price.  Each subsequent column shows 
the results of a specification that includes more independent variables.  Most of the coefficient 
estimates are intuitive and many are statistically significant at conventional levels of 
significance.40  The coefficient on the log of the natural gas price is close to one (e.g., 0.79 to 
0.93), as it should be in a market in which gas is on the margin most of the time.  In columns 3 
and 4 of Table 1, the coefficient estimates on the logs of the Arizona Public Service (APS) and 
                                                 
38 Econometric models are estimated using specific numerical techniques.  Perhaps the most common technique is 
ordinary least squares, which involves estimating coefficients so as to minimize the sum of the squared deviations 
between actual realizations of the dependent variable and the predictions of the model. 
39 We have also estimated versions of the model that modify the standard errors to account for serial correlation, i.e., 
the fact that certain unobserved factors may influence prices across multiple days and hence each day should not be 
treated as an independent observation for the purposes of statistical inference.  In general the standard errors are 
larger, but virtually all of the coefficients that are statistically significant in the ordinary least squares model are still 
statistically significant with the modified standard errors.  We have not adjusted the power price data so that it is 
consistent with the WECC pre-scheduling calendar, i.e., we treat every week as if it is normal and excludes holidays. 
40 A t-statistic in excess of ~1.96 in absolute value indicates that, assuming that the true coefficient is in fact zero, 
that a coefficient equal to or greater than the observed coefficient in absolute value would be observed due to 
random chance with only 5% probability, i.e., the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.  
T-statistics that meet this criterion are marked with one or two asterisks.  Two asterisks indicate that the coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
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CAISO loads are large and statistically significant.  These estimates suggest that a 10% increase 
in either the Southwest or California load approximately leads to a 5% increase in price.   
 
As expected, the nuclear variables show that increased nuclear availability lowers prices (see 
column 4 in Table 1).  Somewhat counter-intuitively, Palo Verde nuclear availability lowers 
prices in the summer and shoulder periods but not in the winter.  In contrast, the coefficients on 
California nuclear availability have the expected signs and are statistically significant for the 
summer and winter but not for the shoulder period.  It could be that differentiating availability by 
season is not capturing the distinction between planned and unplanned outages in the way that 
we hoped. 
 
It is interesting that the coefficients on California and Palo Verde nuclear availability for the 
summer are roughly equal in magnitude.  The coefficients of these independent variables suggest 
that the availability of an additional 1,000 MW nuclear unit leads to approximately a 2% drop in 
price.  The fact that a MW of availability has the same effect on the Palo Verde price regardless 
of whether it is at Palo Verde or in California suggests that the two markets are tightly integrated.   
 
The month dummies show a counter-intuitive pattern of higher-than-average prices in some 
summer months in the second regression model and lower-than-average prices in the third and 
fourth regression model. However, given the other variables in the model, such as load, the 
interpretation of the month dummies is not straightforward.  For example, holding load constant, 
we might expect lower prices in the summer because maintenance outages are scheduled to 
maximize the availability of thermal units in the summer.  The day-of-week dummies show 
lower prices on Friday and higher prices on Saturday, as we would expect from the fact that 
Friday and Saturday are traded as a package.  Finally, the year dummies show a downward 
overall trend decline in prices from 2002-2004, conditional on all other observable variables.  
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Table 1.  Palo Verde regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log of the gas price at the Southern Cal. border 0.795 0.870 0.943 0.936
(49.75)** (32.75)** (40.49)** (39.85)**
Month dummies:
February 0.049 0.054 0.042
(2.78)** (3.63)** (2.74)**
March 0.069 0.073 0.141
(3.96)** (4.88)** (1.92)
April 0.006 -0.003 0.038
(0.35) (0.19) (0.53)
May 0.017 -0.092 -0.014
(0.95) (5.52)** (0.19)
June 0.133 -0.106 -0.014
(7.50)** (4.98)** (0.14)
July 0.325 -0.022 0.092
(18.55)** (0.87) (0.89)
August 0.169 -0.149 -0.034
(9.90)** (6.34)** (0.33)
September 0.068 -0.170 -0.089
(3.89)** (8.42)** (1.14)
October 0.053 -0.015 0.016
(2.98)** (0.96) (0.22)
November -0.020 -0.010 0.040
(1.11) (0.62) (0.56)
December 0.006 -0.060 -0.067
(0.30) (3.49)** (3.67)**
Day-of-week dummmies:
Tuesday -0.041 -0.050 -0.050
(3.30)** (4.72)** (4.84)**
Wednesday -0.029 -0.041 -0.039
(2.35)* (3.88)** (3.84)**
Thursday -0.032 -0.039 -0.038
(2.64)** (3.77)** (3.74)**
Friday -0.083 -0.082 -0.081
(6.77)** (7.81)** (7.82)**
Saturday -0.056 0.013 0.012
(4.55)** (1.10) (1.05)
Year dummies:
2002 0.022 0.074 0.081
(1.41) (5.35)** (5.72)**
2003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
2004 -0.043 -0.091 -0.096
(4.78)** (11.15)** (10.95)**
Load variables:
log of APS load 0.486 0.522
(9.85)** (10.76)**
log of CAISO load 0.544 0.517
(6.94)** (6.73)**
Nuclear variables:
Availability of the Palo Verde plant (MW)
Summer -0.00002
(2.64)**
Winter 0.00001
(0.85)
Shoulder -0.00004
(5.73)**
Availability of California nuclear plants (MW)
Summer -0.00003
(1.98)*
Winter -0.00003
(4.26)**
Shoulder -0.00000
(0.01)
Constant 2.567 2.428 -7.053 -6.968
(106.52)** (57.86)** (10.46)** (10.43)**
Observations 882 882 882 875
R-squared 0.74 0.86 0.90 0.91
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the log of the PV day-ahead on-peak price.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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The Mid-Columbia results are shown in Table 2.  These results are somewhat more anomalous 
and puzzling. While many of the parameter estimates have the expected signs and economically 
plausible magnitudes, some do not.  In particular, the coefficients on gas (which range between 
1.2 and 1.5) are higher than economically plausible for a market in which gas is usually on the 
margin.  We discuss some possible explanations of these results related to transmission 
congestion below in section 5.7. 
 
Dissecting the Mid-Columbia results from a more technical point of view, we offer the following 
observations.  First, the elasticity of the power price with respect to the gas price is greater than 
one (that is, for every percentage point increase in the gas price, the price of power increases by 
more than one percent), which is an unexpected and surprising result and suggests that the gas 
price may be capturing some factor that we have neglected to include in the model.   For 
example, as we discuss in section 5.7, rising gas prices tend to be associated with the end of the 
sometimes extreme low prices experienced in the Northwest during the spring runoff.  
Alternatively, the high coefficient on the gas price variable may indicate that the Malin gas price 
is not a good proxy for the prices actually paid by generators in the Pacific Northwest and 
Northern California.   
 
Second, the hydro variables (i.e., Grand Coulee reservoir levels and actual vs. typical snow pack) 
are negative and have the expected signs. 
 
Third, many of the coefficients on the nuclear availability variables are either statistically 
insignificant or have the wrong signs.41 
 
Fourth, similar to the Palo Verde regression results, the pattern of the coefficients on the month 
dummies is strange, but given all of the other variables in the model that vary by season, 
including load and at least one of the hydro variables, the interpretation of the month dummies is 
complicated. 
 
Finally, the day-of-week dummies exhibit the same Friday/Saturday pattern and the year 
dummies show the same secular decline in prices as in the Palo Verde regression. 
 
Stepping back and looking at the Palo Verde and Mid-Columbia results together provides 
support for our initial observation that a few key variables (natural gas fuel prices and load 
levels) provide significant ability to explain power prices.  One measure for assessing the fit (or 
explanatory power) of a model is the R2 statistic that measures the fraction of the variance of the 
dependent variable that can be explained by the econometric model. For example, the R2 for the 
Palo Verde model that includes the most comprehensive set of independent variables suggests 
that the model explains 91% of the variations in log prices during the period examined.  
Interestingly, a univariate regression of the log price on the log gas price explains 74% of the 
variation in price while including a full set of temporal dummies increases R2 to 86%.  Adding 
the APS and CAISO load variables increases R2 to 90%.  Adding the remaining variables, even 
though their coefficients are statistically significant, does little to improve the fit of the model.  
                                                 
41 One conjecture about the California nuclear coefficients is that the outages of nuclear units in California somehow 
limits import capability from the Pacific Northwest resulting in more congestion out of the Pacific Northwest and 
lower prices there. 
A Regional Approach to Market Monitoring in the West    
   21
This pattern of R2 occurs for at least two reasons: First, key drivers such as fuel prices and loads 
explain a large fraction of the variation in electric prices.  Second, even though other factors, 
such as nuclear unit outages sometimes have statistically significant effects on prices, they occur 
sufficiently rarely that adding variables that capture these factors to the model does little to 
explain variation in prices over long periods of time — even though they may be important to 
understanding the behavior of prices at a point in time. 
 
The same pattern of relatively few variables explaining a relatively large fraction of the variation 
in (log) price exists across the Mid-C regressions although it is hard to be as confident in the 
explanatory power of the same limited set of fundamental variables given some of the counter-
intuitive parameter estimates. 
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Table 2.  Mid-Columbia regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log of the gas price at Malin 1.225 1.405 1.459 1.536 1.514
(40.13)** (25.18)** (26.20)** (27.57)** (27.11)**
Month dummies:
February 0.037 0.062 0.070 0.062
(0.88) (1.52) (1.77) (1.54)
March -0.023 0.024 0.052 -0.366
(0.54) (0.53) (1.15) (2.44)*
April -0.235 -0.162 -0.030 -0.527
(5.56)** (3.07)** (0.56) (3.35)**
May -0.227 -0.218 -0.167 -0.558
(5.36)** (4.11)** (3.22)** (3.74)**
June -0.538 -0.655 -0.686 -1.670
(12.85)** (13.89)** (14.97)** (8.19)**
July -0.146 -0.433 -0.461 -1.590
(3.50)** (8.19)** (8.99)** (7.07)**
August -0.039 -0.282 -0.350 -1.485
(0.94) (5.36)** (6.78)** (6.61)**
September -0.007 -0.144 -0.213 -0.673
(0.16) (2.47)* (3.73)** (4.21)**
October -0.059 -0.042 -0.124 -0.555
(1.39) (0.83) (2.46)* (3.57)**
November -0.098 -0.085 -0.186 -0.579
(2.22)* (1.99)* (4.27)** (3.83)**
December -0.165 -0.223 -0.312 -0.271
(3.58)** (4.98)** (6.92)** (6.23)**
Day-of-week dummmies:
Tuesday -0.032 -0.052 -0.054 -0.056
(1.07) (1.84) (1.98)* (2.17)*
Wednesday -0.023 -0.047 -0.051 -0.050
(0.79) (1.66) (1.89) (1.95)
Thursday -0.036 -0.052 -0.060 -0.059
(1.25) (1.87) (2.21)* (2.29)*
Friday -0.093 -0.093 -0.107 -0.104
(3.15)** (3.28)** (3.88)** (3.99)**
Saturday -0.058 0.092 0.060 0.070
(1.96)* (2.76)** (1.84) (2.24)*
Year dummies:
2002 0.143 0.209 0.086 0.236
(3.56)** (5.19)** (2.48)* (6.08)**
2003 0.025 0.084 0.000 0.123
(1.15) (3.84)** (.) (4.85)**
2004 0.000 0.000 -0.178 0.000
(.) (.) (7.15)** (.)
Load variables:
log of Pacificorp load 0.531 0.344 0.469
(2.36)* (1.57) (2.23)*
log of CAISO load 1.281 1.147 1.112
(6.69)** (6.04)** (6.07)**
Hydro variables:
Grand Coulee reservoir level relative to normal -16.397 -10.434
(7.82)** (4.92)**
log the difference between actual and typical snow pack -0.248 -0.143
(3.93)** (2.26)*
Nuclear variables:
Availability of the Columbia plant (MW)
Summer -0.0000
(0.85)
Winter -0.0001
(1.97)*
Shoulder 0.0002
Availability of California nuclear plants (MW)
Summer 0.0003
(6.96)**
Winter 0.0000
(1.90)
Shoulder 0.0001
(3.64)**
Constant 1.738 1.589 -16.315 4.096 -3.147
(38.79)** (16.89)** (7.55)** (1.22) (0.95)
Observations 881 881 881 878 872
R-squared 0.65 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.80
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the log of the Mid-C day-ahead on-peak price.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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5.6 Using Econometric Models to Identify Anomalous Prices 
An econometric model may establish a baseline that can be used to assess whether power prices 
are anomalously high or low.  With an econometric model with good explanatory capability, it 
should be possible to predict prices based on observed fuel prices and other variables.  To the 
extent that prices diverge from the model predictions, they may be deemed anomalous. 
Anomalous prices may warrant further investigation to determine the cause(s) of such deviations 
from expected prices.  On the other hand, if the model has been poorly specified for one reason 
or another, one could not be confident that discrepancies between the model’s results and 
observed prices did not arise from shortcomings of the model itself.  For example, a model 
estimated on data from a period with abnormally high prices, due to the exercise of market 
power or some other factor, may consistently produce predictions significantly above observed 
prices.   
 
To analyze the quality of our econometric model, we used the coefficient estimates of our most 
comprehensive models (i.e., column 4 in Table 1 and column 5 in Table 2) to estimate predicted 
prices.  We calculated the variance of the prediction errors, i.e., the differences between the 
predicted and observed prices.  We then examined instances in which the predicted price 
diverged from the actual price by more than three standard deviations, since this would indicate 
situations outside of expected bounds of variation.42    Figure 1 shows predicted log prices, and 
actual (log) prices for Palo Verde and bands that are three standard deviations above and below 
our predicted prices. 
 
                                                 
42 Yoo and Meroney (2005) do essentially the same thing, but for two differences.  First, they use a more 
complicated econometric model, known as a GARCH model, in which the variance of the error term is allowed to 
vary over time.  Second, they estimate their model on data from one period, and then examine prediction errors that 
result from applying their model out-of-sample, i.e., to a different set of data than they use to estimate their model.  
We plan to explore the ability of our models to predict prices out of sample in future work as more data become 
available.  Out-of-sample prediction errors tend to be larger than the in-sample prediction errors that we examine.  
On the other hand, in GARCH models, the variance of the error term tends to be largest when the realizations of the 
dependent variable are furthest from the predictions of the model, making it more difficult to find observations that 
meet Yoo and Meroney’s three standard deviation criterion. 
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Figure 3.  Palo Verde predicted prices, 3-standard error bands, and outliers 
 
The model predictions are shown in purple.  Three standard-error bands around the predictions 
are shown in green and orange.  The standard error bands are pretty wide.  (Recall that 0.1 in log 
terms represents approximately a 10% difference in levels.)  Assuming that the assumptions used 
to generate the bands are valid, we would expect prices to fall outside of the bands less than 
0.3% of the time.  The specific observations that fall outside of the three-standard-error bands are 
shown as blue dots. 
 
There are a handful of instances in which the actual power price falls outside of the three 
standard deviation bands.  We looked into these instances. The visible price spike in 2002 
occurred during the week beginning July 8.  There was a heat wave in California combined with 
outages of major fossil generating units during that week.43  This suggests that the econometric 
model may not adequately capture the non-linear relationship between price and load during 
such genuine shortage conditions.  In addition, the model might have fit the prices for that week 
better if it had included a measure of fossil generator availability — presuming that the outages 
themselves were legitimate and did not reflect attempts to withhold capacity from the market.44  
Another visible price spike occurred at the end of February 2003, which was a period of very 
high gas prices.  To a certain extent high gas prices should be captured in the model, but the 
prices that individual generators pay at specific locations and at specific times within a day can 
                                                 
43  California EnergyMarkets 2002. 
44 As discussed above, data on fossil generator outages are not as readily available as data on nuclear outages. 
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diverge significantly from the index prices when gas markets are very tight.45  There were also 
unexpected outages of major fossil generating units — including both Mohave units — that 
week.46 
 
Figure 2 shows the same type of information on predicted versus actual power prices for Mid-
Columbia.  To the extent that there are anomalous prices, they seem to be anomalously low.  In 
all three years of our sample, these downward price spikes occur in June, during the tail end of 
the spring run-off.  This suggests that the combination of our hydro variables and month 
dummies are not adequately capturing the manner in which water is managed in the Columbia 
and Snake River basins.  For example, it could be that substantial amounts of hydroelectricity are 
produced in this period because, once reservoirs are full or are on a path so that they are likely to 
be full by the end of the spring run-off, the opportunity cost of hydroelectricity is zero, i.e., the 
alternative to generating hydroelectricity is spill at some future date.  Our model may not capture 
this non-linear relationship between reservoir levels and prices. 
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Figure 4.  Mid-Columbia predicted prices, 3-standard error bands, and outliers 
 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the models, they seem to suggest that simple fundamental 
models explain a significant fraction of the variation in on-peak power prices during 2002-2004.  
Some of the most glaring deviations from the predictions of the models potentially are explained 
                                                 
45 For a discussion of this issues see the summary of FERC’s report on the January 2004 gas price spike in New 
England.  (http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20040524155310-05-24-04-necpuc.pdf) 
46 California Energy Markets  2003. 
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by fundamental factors that have been excluded from the model such as outages of fossil units, 
or factors that may be not correctly specified (e.g., hydro during the spring run-off period).  With 
this in mind, using well-constructed econometric models to create baseline depictions of 
“expected prices” could be helpful in identifying prices (or conditions) that fall outside the 
normal bounds and which deserve further scrutiny from a market monitoring point of view. 
 
5.7 Congestion 
Thus far, in our analysis, we have ignored the fact that regional markets tend to separate into 
sub-regional markets in the presence of transmission congestion.  It is important to address the 
effect of congestion on prices, given that transmission constraints are binding in different parts of 
the Western power markets at different times over the course of the year. 
 
5.7.1 The Frequency and Magnitude of Congestion in the West 
Absent data on physical constraints on the transmission system, congestion is usually inferred 
from price differences.  Inferring congestion from bilateral prices (such as those for major 
trading hubs in the West) is somewhat subjective.  Bilateral contracts frequently trade at a range 
of prices during the day.  If the difference between the bilateral prices at two locations is roughly 
on a par with the variation in price within a day at one location, the differences across hubs could 
merely reflect random normal intraday price volatility.  In addition, while congestion between 
two points is a characteristic of a network at a point in time, bilateral contracts cover multi-hour 
periods during which congestion might arise intermittently.  Finally, price differences arise due 
to transmission tariffs and losses even in the absence of congestion.  These factors make it 
difficult to make precise inferences about congestion from prices alone.  Nevertheless, price 
differences provide some indication of the presence of congestion. 
 
Figure 5 gives some sense for the extent and direction of congestion in the West during the 
period covered by our analysis.  The top portion of Figure 5 shows the distribution of Palo 
Verde/SP15 (on-peak) price differential for our sample period, i.e., the differential is positive 
when the PV price is higher.  The SP15 price is higher on average, but, with a few minor 
exceptions, the differential is relatively small, consistent with anecdotal evidence that congestion 
between the Southwest and Southern California is relatively limited.  Of the 880 days for which 
we have bilateral prices for both locations, the price difference exceeds $5/MWh in absolute 
value for only 204 days (i.e. 20-25% of the time).  The bottom portion of Figure 5 shows the 
NP15/Mid-Columbia differential.  Prices in California at NP15 are almost always higher than 
prices in the Pacific Northwest and sometimes significantly so, indicating the presence of 
economically significant congestion of more than intermittent frequency.  Of the 843 days for 
which we have prices for both NP15 and Mid-Columbia, the price difference exceeds $5/MWh 
for 634 days and $10/MWh for 280 days (i.e. 30% of the time).47 
 
                                                 
47 Note how these results compare to the very limited geographic price differentials identified by the simulations 
discussed in the next section.  As we discuss in section 6.5.1, the absence of congestion in the simulations is one 
reason that we question their usefulness for market monitoring. 
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Figure 5.  Histograms of PV/SP15 and NP15/Mid-C price differentials 
 
It is also helpful to understand not only the magnitudes of price differentials, but also their 
distribution across time.  Figure 6 shows how the price differentials are distributed across time.  
The first panel shows that the PV/SP15 price differential is the highest during the summer 
months when air conditioning loads peak in the Southwest.  It is the most negative in the fall.  In 
contrast, the NP15/Mid-C price differential is the most positive in the late spring and early 
summer, presumably due to the spring run-off, when more hydroelectricity is generated than can 
be exported readily.  It also tends to be large although less so, during the summer when 
California tends to import large amounts of power from the Pacific Northwest.  It is the least 
positive in the winter when loads peak in the Pacific Northwest. 
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Figure 6.  Western price differentials over time 
 
5.7.2 The Theoretical Relationship between Congestion and Prices 
Incorporating congestion into an econometric analysis of wholesale prices is tricky.  In essence, 
congestion makes the relationship between prices and certain fundamental variables non-linear in 
a very specific way. 
 
Consider the following stylized example: there are two adjacent regions, AZ and CA, linked by 
transmission.  There are no losses, the wheeling charge between the two regions is zero, there are 
no transmission constraints within each region, and the regions are only interconnected with one 
another, not with any other regions.  There are three possible states of transmission congestion 
between the regions: (1) no congestion, (2) congestion into CA from AZ, and (3) congestion into 
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AZ from CA.  When there is no congestion between the two regions, the two regions constitute 
one integrated market.  The price is determined by the intersection of demand across the whole 
market and a supply curve reflecting the resources in both regions.  If there is congestion into CA 
from AZ, then any incremental demand in CA has no effect on the price in AZ.  In addition, any 
incremental demand in AZ can only be met with resources that are internal to AZ.  This is true 
until the point where AZ demand rises sufficiently to equalize prices between the two regions  If 
there is congestion into AZ from CA, then incremental demand in AZ can only be met with AZ 
resources.  In addition, demand in CA has no effect on prices in AZ until it rises sufficiently to 
equalize prices in the two regions.   
 
These relationships are shown graphically in Figure 7 and 
Load in CA 
Congested 
out of AZ 
Integrated 
Congested into 
AZ 
Price in 
AZ 
 
Figure 8.  Each figure shows the relationship between price and internal/external load, 
conditional on the external/internal load remaining constant.  For example, the same load in AZ 
is more likely to result in congestion into AZ when the load in CA is lower, i.e., when load in CA 
is lower, more low cost resources are available to serve load in AZ and energy is more likely to 
flow to AZ resulting in congestion into AZ. 
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Figure 7.  Theoretical relationship between price and internal load (conditional on external load) 
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Figure 8.  Theoretical relationship between price and external load (conditional on internal load) 
 
5.7.3 Econometric Literature on Congestion 
The examples above show how congestion might affect the relationship between price and one 
fundamental variable, i.e. load.  The existing econometric literature does not focus on the effect 
of congestion on the level of prices per se.  Instead, it focuses on estimating the likelihood of the 
presence and specific direction of congestion and certain parameters such as the cost of losses 
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incurred by moving power from one region to another, the tariffs that traders actually pay, as 
opposed to the posted tariffs, to move power between regions, and the “shadow value” of 
transmission in the presence of transmission constraints, i.e., the value of an incremental increase 
in transmission capacity. 
 
For example, Bailey (1998) applies three distinct techniques to assess the extent to which 
transmission constraints cause prices at major hubs in the West to separate.  The first approach 
involves modeling correlations between prices at different hubs as functions of different 
fundamental factors that may lead prices to separate, such as transmission path de-ratings.  The 
second approach attempts to measure the extent to which prices at different locations separate as 
a function of fundamental factors that tend to be associated with congestion. Using this approach, 
Bailey is able to develop econometric estimates of the extent of losses and the magnitude of 
wheeling charges. The last approach involves estimating a “switching model.”  The switching 
model is based on the assumption that while prices are observed, transmission tariffs and 
whether price differences exceed transmission tariffs and hence congestion exists are not directly 
observed.  She estimates that congestion exists between the Pacific Northwest and California 
during approximately 20 percent of the on-peak periods during which power flows from the 
Pacific Northwest to California.  Kleit and Reitzes (2005) also estimate a switching model.  They 
use their model to estimate the shadow value of transmission between ECAR and PJM and 
between PJM and the NYISO. 
 
5.7.4 Estimating the Effect of Congestion on Price Levels 
The papers cited above are primarily concerned with understanding price differences between 
regions.  In contrast, we are primarily concerned with understanding price levels at different 
locations, while recognizing that transmission congestion potentially influences price levels.  
One approach might involve estimating a switching model of price levels rather than price 
differences.  In such a model, there would be at least two potential states, one corresponding to 
integration and another corresponding to congestion.  In the congested state, it would be 
assumed, for example that load in a congested-in area could not influence prices an adjacent 
congestion-out area.  Such a model requires choices of variables that it is assumed influence the 
probability of the occurrence of a particular state.  For example, high load in California 
combined with low load in the Southwest might increase the probability of congestion from the 
Southwest into California.  When the variables that predict congestion, however, are among the 
variables that also drive prices, such as loads at various locations, then the switching model is 
effectively a linear regression model similar to the ones that we have estimated above, but with 
additional non-linear terms in the variables that both influence prices and are related to 
congestion.  In fact, these non-linear terms should capture exactly the types of non-linearities 
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depicted above in Figure 7 and 
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Figure 8. 
 
Alternatively, we could estimate models that allow the relationship between prices and 
fundamental variables to differ for periods during which there is a strong presumption that 
congestion occurs.  One crude way of analyzing the impact of congestion is to estimate separate 
models on samples defined by the presence or absence of observed congestion, as measured by 
price differences between the region of interest and adjoining regions or other similar metrics.  
The main problem with this approach is that congestion is endogenous, i.e., it is an outcome not 
a root cause.  For example, high load in an area without adequate generation and low load in 
another area with more than adequate generation might give rise to flows between the areas that 
lead to congestion.  On the other hand, behavior can lead to congestion.  For example, 
withholding in California, in addition to raising prices in California, might cause flows into 
California that eventually lead to congestion.  If congestion results from the behavior that the 
market monitor is trying to detect, it should not be taken as given in formulating a benchmark by 
which to assess the competitiveness of a market. 
 
Nevertheless, we present some results based on splitting our sample into observations from 
congested and un-congested periods.  We discuss some potential econometric approaches to the 
“endogenous congestion” problem below.  As discussed above, it is not uncommon for prices in 
the Pacific Northwest to be extremely low during the spring run-off.48  When this happens, the 
Northwest market becomes separated from the California market and California fundamentals 
should no longer influence Northwest prices on the margin.  As a rough attempt to identify these 
periods, we divide our data into periods in which the market heat rate at Mid-C falls below 6 
                                                 
48 For example, for most of June and July 2002, prices at Mid-C were below the cost of gas-fired generation and the 
Columbia nuclear generating station was limited to less than its full output due to abundant hydroelectricity and 
several major transmission outages on the interfaces between the Northwest and California.  See “Southwest Not So 
Hot; Northwest Not So Wet,” California Energy Markets, July 26, 2002, 679:3. 
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MMBtu/MWh and all other periods.  We choose this threshold because it reflects a heat rate 
below that of any gas-fired resource.  Given that gas is almost always on the margin in 
California, a market heat rate below the efficiency of any gas fired resource strongly suggests 
that the Northwest market is not integrated with the California market.  There are econometric 
issues associated with dividing the sample based on a transformation of the variable that we are 
trying to explain, namely price.  Ideally, we would like to model the fundamental drivers of very 
low prices in the Northwest rather than condition our analysis on the realization of very low 
prices.  Nevertheless, the following results provide some insight into how the relationship 
between prices and fundamental variables can change under conditions which lead to congestion 
out of the Northwest.  
 
Table 3.  Mid-C models by market heat rate 
Dependent variable is the log of the Mid-C on-peak price
Models include month and day-of-week dummies
<6 >=6
Log of the Malin gas price 1.808 1.030
(6.84)** (32.65)**
Log of PacifiCorp load 0.882 0.471
(0.98) (4.15)**
Log of CAISO load 1.052 0.612
(1.42) (6.07)**
Grand Coulee reservoir level relative to normal 6.688 -7.354
(0.68) (6.48)**
Log the difference between actual and typical snow pack 0.075 -0.208
(0.14) (5.62)**
Availability of the Columbia nuclear plant (MW) 0.00029 -0.00004
(2.46)* (2.67)**
Availability of California nuclear plants (MW) 0.00005 0.00002
(0.67) (2.68)**
Observations 119 753
R-squared 0.82 0.88
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Market heat rate
 
 
The results are interesting and raise a few technical issues that warrant attention when exploring 
the appropriate way(s) to construct econometric models when the issue is price prediction in 
Western wholesale power markets.  On the one hand, the results for the sample in which the 
market heat rate is greater than or equal to 6 MMBtu/MWh look relatively “normal.”  The 
coefficient on gas is close to one and the coefficients on most of the other variables besides the 
California nuclear variables have the expected signs.  On the other hand, the results for the 
sample in which the market heat rate is below 6 MMBtu/MWh have no plausible economic 
interpretation.  The coefficient on gas is large even though anecdotal evidence suggests that gas 
is not on the margin during the days in this sample.  In addition, the coefficients on the load 
variables are much larger than in the other sample.  In particular, the coefficient on the log of 
California load is large even though California load should not drive Northwest prices when the 
Northwest is congested out. 
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Given the unexpected character of these results, we strongly suspect that these results reflect 
“Omitted Variable Bias.”  This occurs when a variable that is included in the model captures the 
effect of another variable.  In this case, the load and gas price variables that capture the loads and 
gas prices during the Junes and Julys of our sample tended to rise as the spring run-off ebbed and 
transmission outages between the Northwest and California were rectified.  Perhaps this 
econometric problem could be addressed by including a variable that captures hydro generation 
in addition to the variable that we already include that reflects reservoir levels.  If we were to 
include such a variable, we would need to be careful to distinguish between the hydro generation 
due to the spring run-off that is essentially uncontrollable and exogenous and hydro generation 
that is the result of economic decisions to use reservoir hydro in response to prices that is 
endogenous.  We are not aware of a clean way to do that given our data.  It might be reasonable 
to assume that all hydroelectricity in May-July is essentially exogenous. 
 
These results also suggest that the results for the full sample, reported in section 5.5, are at least 
partially driven by data from the period of extreme low prices during the spring runoff in the 
Northwest.  If econometric models such as the ones estimated in this report are to be used for 
market monitoring, clearly more attention should be given to understanding the price formation 
process in these periods. 
 
We have had marginally more success identifying the types of non-linear effects of load on price 
resulting from congestion in our Palo Verde models.  The following shows the relationship 
between the PV/SP15 price differential and the loads in CAISO and APS control areas.  The 
green line shows the price differential, the red dots show CAISO load (normalized so that their 
scale is roughly similar to that of the APS loads), and the blue dots show APS loads.  From the 
figure, it is easy to see the regular patterns in PV/SP15 price differentials.  The PV price tends to 
rise above the SP15 price only when the Southwest experiences extremely high loads in the 
summer.  For much of the year, the differential hovers in the $0/MWh to -$5/MWh range.  It can 
fall below this range in the winter when APS loads are low so that more low-cost resources from 
the Southwest are available to serve California loads and hydro availability in both California 
and the Pacific Northwest is limited.  In addition, the dip in the price differential at the end of 
2004 corresponds to a period of significant nuclear outages in California. 
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Figure 9.  PV/SP15 price differential and CAISO and APS loads 
 
Given the type of pattern that shows up so dramatically in Figure 9, we estimated versions of our 
model in which the load and nuclear availability variables are allowed to vary depending on 
whether or not there is congestion.  We define days as congested out if the price in SP15 exceeds 
the Palo Verde price by more than $5/MWh.  There are 195 such days in our sample.  The results 
are consistent with the theory described above.  When a market is congested out, internal loads 
and resources have bigger effects on price and external resources have smaller effects on price 
on the margin.  For example, the results below suggest that California loads have essentially no 
marginal effect on prices on congested out days.49  The one counter-intuitive result is the 
coefficient on the interaction between the congestion variable and the California nuclear 
availability variable; this suggests that California nuclear availability reduces Palo Verde prices 
by more when there is congestion out of Palo Verde than when no congestion exists. 
 
                                                 
49 The sum of the coefficients on log CAISO load and log CAISO load interacted with a congested out dummy is 
approximately zero. 
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Table 4.  PV regression with congested-out terms 
Dependent variable is the log of the PV on-peak price
Models include month and day-of-week dummies
Log of the SoCal border gas price 0.958
(39.97)**
Congestion out dummy 2.879
(2.57)*
Log APS load 0.465
(9.06)**
Cong. out X Log APS Load 0.310
(3.33)**
Availability of the PV nuclear plant (MW) -0.00002
(4.21)**
Cong. out X Availability of the PV nuclear plant (MW) -0.00003
(2.07)*
Log CAISO load 0.583
(7.05)**
Cong. out X Log CAISO load -0.504
(3.10)**
Availability of California nuclear plants (MW) -0.00000
(0.65)
Cong. out X Availability of California nuclear plants (MW) -0.00003
(2.86)**
Observations 873
R-squared 0.91
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
As discussed above, it could be potentially inappropriate and misleading to treat congestion as 
exogenous if regressions similar to the ones reported above were to be used for market 
monitoring.  One possible solution to this problem would be to use “instrumental variables” 
estimation.  In “instrumental variables” estimation, regressions similar to the ones above would 
be estimated.  Instead of using direct measures of congestion, the instrumental variables 
estimates would use predictions of congestion based on fundamental variables that are correlated 
with congestion, i.e., the so-called “instruments.”  The trick is finding good instruments.  Good 
instruments should be correlated with congestion but not subject to the types of manipulation by 
market participants that the market monitor seeks to detect.  For example, transmission outages, 
to the extent that they are not the result of strategic behavior themselves, may be good 
instruments to use for congestion.  This is one area where additional data could clearly help.50 
 
Another approach suggested by Figure 9 is to attempt to identify the configuration of 
fundamental variables that ultimately lead to congestion.  For example, high loads in California 
and relatively low loads in APS seem to be associated with congestion.  The following is a graph 
                                                 
50 We have not attempted to use OASIS data to identify path deratings, although hourly data on the OTCs and ATCs 
on major paths into California are available from the CAISO OASIS.  WECC’s daily report also contains marginally 
less detailed data on transmission deratings and outages in a less readily usable form than the CAISO OASIS data. 
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of the PV/SP15 price differential against the ratio of California load (net of the availability of 
California nuclear plants) to the APS load.51  While there is certainly a negative relationship, as 
might be expected, the relationship is not that tight as might be hoped.  For example, there are a 
significant number of days when the load ratio is relatively low, but the price differentials are 
still large and negative.  We might be able to identify a tighter relationship with additional data 
on, for example, outages of fossil-fueled generating plants. 
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Figure 10.  Relationship between PV/SP15 price differential and CAISO/APS load ratio 
 
Congestion has important effects on wholesale prices.  Before using econometric models for 
market monitoring screening purposes, it would be useful to develop more complete 
characterizations of the effects of the market fundamentals that lead to congestion on wholesale 
prices in the West—particularly the effect of hydro conditions on congestion out of the 
Northwest and Northwest wholesale prices. 
 
 
                                                 
51 We do not adjust the APS load to account for the availability of the Palo Verde nuclear generating station. The 
CAISO load is the vast majority of the load in California and hence netting out a proxy for nuclear generation results 
in a reasonable approximation of the demand for energy from other sources in California.  In contrast, we are using 
the APS load as a proxy for regional conditions in the Southwest.  APS load is a small fraction of all load in the 
Southwest.  Hence, netting out PV nuclear availability from the APS load may provide a misleading measure of 
broader regional conditions.  
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6. Using Production Cost Model Simulations of Western Power Markets for Market 
Monitoring 
In this section we discuss a concrete application of production cost modeling techniques for 
market monitoring (see Section 3.2 for conceptual discussion). One reason for conducting this 
type of scoping analysis is that production cost models are a widely available analysis tool in the 
electric industry, and have been used for various market assessment questions in the West as well 
as more generally in the electricity industry.52  These models have been used for many years by 
utilities in planning contexts and in regulatory proceedings covering a variety of topics.  Given 
the lack of market monitoring institutions in the West, the experience of model vendors and users 
with production cost models provides some institutional and experience base on which market 
monitoring and assessment activities can build.  
 
In addition, production cost model results provides proxies for the types of detailed operational 
data to which market monitors in RTOs have access.   In the absence of an RTO, it is an open 
question whether a market monitor could obtain access to these types of rich operational data.  
To the extent that a West-wide market monitor would not be able to review actual unit 
commitment and dispatch decisions of control area operators, as company-specific market 
monitors do (see section 7), running production cost models may provide relatively little 
incremental value from a market monitoring standpoint. 
 
One approach to applying production cost modeling to market monitoring involves using models 
with inputs designed to reflect real-time system conditions in order to formulate estimates of 
near-term competitive prices.  This approach to market monitoring is extremely resource-
intensive (see Section 3.2).  Given limited resources, we decided to use the results of a relatively 
limited number of simulations of Western power markets based on a few concrete scenarios to 
understand price formation in the West.  It is important to note that these simulations were 
created as part of a long-run planning effort and were never intended to be used for market 
monitoring.  However, because the simulations were available and produce the types of rich data 
that are typically available from Day 2 RTO markets, we thought that they were worth exploring.  
Ultimately, as discussed below, our investigation led us to conclude that the conditions modeled 
in the production cost simulations seem to be sufficiently far-removed from present and recent 
historical conditions that they are of limited use for explaining observed prices and therefore may 
be of limited usefulness for market monitoring purposes. 
 
6.1 Choice of Production Cost Study 
We present results based on the GridView model used by the Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council (WECC) for various regional studies.53  The data used for this analysis were assembled 
initially and periodically updated by the Seams Steering Group of the Western Interconnection 
(SSG-WI).   ABB, in conjunction with WECC, has conducted studies for SSG-WI that examined 
the future transmission system needs of the Western grid under various load and resource 
                                                 
52 Examples of the use of these models in the west include studies of RTO costs and benefits such as Tabors, 
Caramanis, and Associates (TCA) 2002 and Henwood (2004).  
53 See http://www.wecc.biz/wrap.php?file=wrap/about.html for background on WECC. 
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scenarios.  These studies report results for two years: 2008 and 2015.  Given SSG-WI’s 
familiarity with this model, we wanted to use it as the starting point for our test of production 
simulation models for market monitoring purposes. 
 
For this project, we contracted with ABB, the GridView vendor, to conduct some simulations 
and provide detailed output for our analysis. Model vendors, like ABB, typically maintain 
databases containing many of the inputs to their models. In some cases these databases rely 
exclusively on publicly available data while, in other cases, proprietary data are used. Appendix 
A, prepared by ABB, describes the GridView model at a high level and documents key 
assumptions used in the study.  
 
6.2 Network Representation 
One of the starting points for any production cost simulation is to clearly define the area to be 
studied, along with the internal “topology” or network configuration depicted in the study.  The 
GridView model is a full nodal model.  Most of the results that we received were for 33 bubbles, 
each encompassing many nodes.54   
 
Figure 11 shows the aggregated topology for which we received results. As discussed below, the 
33 bubble topology does not result in very much congestion as measured by differences in 
average locational marginal prices across bubbles for the SSG-WI 2008 Base Case. Therefore, 
for certain sensitivity analyses, a more aggregated topology may be useful, such as the five 
region aggregation for which results are summarized in Figure 12-Figure 15.  There is also value 
to a level of aggregation that is closer to the state jurisdictional level based upon the interest of 
state regulators in understanding outcomes at this level. 
 
                                                 
54 In modeling the Western Interconnection, the 33 “bubbles” were physically distributed to the 15,000 buses in the 
transmission network. 
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Figure 11.  SSG-WI study topology of the Western Grid 
 
6.3 Treatment of Outages 
Power plant outages and their treatment in a production simulation model influence the results of 
the simulation, since assumptions about outages affect the units that are – and are not – assumed 
to be available for dispatch at any particular time in the modeling period. 
 
Some representation of the expected pattern of forced outages is required for our study, in order 
for the resulting simulation to be representative of the price that would emerge from the market.   
It is our understanding that WECC/SSG-WI does not typically incorporate random forced 
outages in its base case representations, so we needed to adjust the 2008 SSG-WI Base Case to 
reflect forced outages.  
 
There are two ways that forced outages are typically treated in simulation models. The simplest 
approximation is the de-rating method. In this approach, generating unit capacity is reduced by 
the unit’s forced outage rate.55  While easy to implement, the de-rating method produces “too 
smooth” outcomes that tend to understate the potential impact of forced outages. The main 
alternative to de-rating is Monte Carlo simulation. In this approach, it is assumed that the 
availability of each unit at a point in time is a random variable that behaves according to some 
underlying distribution.  For each specific simulation, the availability of each unit at each point 
                                                 
55 This method is typically used in market power simulations presented to FERC such as the Delivered Price Test 
and Market Power Screens. 
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in time is determined by draws from these unit-specific distributions.  Multiple simulations with 
different outage draws are performed and the resulting outcomes are averaged. While Monte 
Carlo is a superior approach on first principles, it can be burdensome to implement and more 
complex to explain, especially if each individual simulation is complex. 
 
For market monitoring purposes, neither approach is ideal. The de-rating approach is unlikely to 
replicate the kind of price spikes that can be associated with the outages of large facilities. Monte 
Carlo simulation poses implementation difficulties.  Our compromise was to have ABB run four 
outage cases in the hope that we would capture at least some of the extreme conditions that can 
result from unusual sets of outages.   
 
6.4 Regional Coordination of Operation 
Regional coordination of operations is an important issue in the US electricity industry.  
Coordination problems were at least partly responsible for the large-scale 2003 blackout in the 
Eastern Interconnection. In RTOs with a large geographic footprint, such as PJM and MISO, 
regional operations within the RTO can be coordinated, even if there are still potential problems 
across RTOs.  The West, by contrast, has fewer institutional arrangements to achieve 
coordination of operations. Bilateral interaction among control areas is the primary mode of 
operation. When it comes to modeling this institutional reality, some care must be taken in 
choosing a representation that reflects the comparative lack of operational integration in the 
region. 
 
6.4.1 Unit Commitment 
One important aspect of modeling coordination relates to the specification of unit commitment 
across large regions with multiple control areas.  Unit commitment is that part of the scheduling 
and dispatch process within a single control area that deals, among other things, with the “slow 
start” property of large steam turbine generators. A unit commitment schedule is developed on a 
daily and weekly basis to decide how many steam turbines should be started and when they 
should be shut down in light of projected demand forecasts. This problem requires sophisticated 
software even in the case of a single control area. When multiple control areas are engaged in 
regional trade, as in the West, the coordination of unit commitment is unlikely to be perfect.  
Indeed, one of the perceived benefits of RTOs is the consolidation of multiple control areas to 
achieve economies that are not otherwise possible. One of these economies is the co-ordination 
of reserves through an optimal unit commitment.56  In addition, even when coordination is 
perfect, unit commitment in the real world involves uncertainty.  Unit commitment, by its nature, 
takes place before system conditions are fully known.  Realized conditions may turn out to be 
very different from the conditions that were expected at the time that units were committed. 
 
Models like GridView are often run under perfect information assumptions, i.e., the models 
assume that future conditions are known with certainty when units are committed. The result of 
perfect information assumptions is relatively smooth prices with comparatively little price 
volatility. Our goal in specifying the assumptions to be used in GridView was to reflect, in some 
                                                 
56 See Midwest ISO (2006). 
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reasonable fashion, the lack of complete co-ordination and perfect foresight in unit commitment 
that we believe is more representative of the actual operation of the Western system. We 
illustrate how modeling choices affect price volatility by contrasting two GridView cases below. 
In each case we asked ABB to use “imperfect unit commitment.” This was achieved by assuming 
that only a subset of all transmission constraints that might materialize at the dispatch phase are 
recognized at the unit commitment phase.  When too few units are committed in specific areas 
because the model fails to anticipate certain transmission constraints, prices go up in those areas 
because expensive fast start units must be used to meet load instead of cheaper slow start units.57 
 
6.4.2 Transmission Losses 
A second important modeling issue involves the treatment of marginal transmission losses. By 
the laws of physics, marginal transmission losses are twice the level of average losses. The load 
forecasts used in the simulations have average losses embedded in them. GridView gives the 
user the option of invoking adjustments for marginal losses or not.  If the marginal loss 
adjustment is invoked, it is our understanding that the GridView model then commits extra 
resources to meet these additional requirements. This has the effect of undoing the imperfect unit 
commitment described above.  
 
To determine the relative importance of these issues in our simulations, we did several sensitivity 
analyses focused on these issues.  Figure 12 and Figure 13 below reflect the price results for 
various regions in the West for the case in which an adjustment is made for marginal losses.  
These figures show the marginal prices for every hour of the 2008 simulated year and are 
aggregated into five sub-regions: Canada (Alberta and British Columbia); the Northwest Power 
Pool (NWPP), including Oregon, Washington and Idaho; the Rocky Mountain Power Pool 
(RMPP), including Montana, Wyoming and Colorado; Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada; and 
the California ISO.  These cases, based on $5/MMBtu gas prices, show very few price spikes in 
the California ISO (CAISO) region relative to recent experience.   
 
                                                 
57 These relationships are illustrated in a related setting in Kahn (1995). This paper shows that when simulation 
modeling is used in a setting where multiple parties with divergent interests participate, modeling variables like the 
commitment target will be selected strategically. 
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Figure 12.  Simulated prices with marginal losses 
 
Figure 13 represents the same data as Figure 12 but in the form of a price duration curve.  
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Figure 13.  Price duration curve from simulation with marginal losses 
 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 are exactly the same cases as shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13; the 
only difference is that the marginal loss option is turned off in these simulations.  The result is 
more and higher price spikes (note that the scale in Figure 14 goes to $90/MWh as opposed to 
$65/MWh in Figure 12). Figure 15 shows that the price spikes are confined to less than 500 
hours. During these hours, high cost fast start units must typically be operated in load pockets.  
Even the prices in the simulations without marginal losses do not reach the levels actually 
observed in day-ahead on-peak strips, which cover multiple hours and hence, due to averaging, 
should be lower than the hourly prices reflected in Figure 15, conditional on fuel prices and other 
variables. 
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Figure 14.  Simulated prices without marginal losses 
 
 
Figure 15.  Price duration curve from simulation without marginal losses 
While we have no way of determining that the simulations behind Figure 14 and Figure 15 are 
“right” in any absolute sense, we feel strongly that the simulations behind Figure 12 and Figure 
13 are clearly not realistic; thus, we focus on the “marginal losses turned off” simulations in the 
remainder of this section. The “too smooth” outcomes in the “marginal losses turned on” 
simulations reflect an ubiquitous, but under-recognized phenomenon in numerical modeling that 
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has recently been called “the optimizer’s curse.”58  The basic idea is that mathematical tools 
applied to uncertain circumstances tend to find solutions that represent the most optimistic 
outcome, not the most likely one. There are many variations on this theme, and it occurs in a 
wide variety of contexts.59 In the context of modeling Western electricity markets, there are 
many sources of co-ordination inefficiencies and probably even more ways to represent them in a 
simulation context. We cannot, in our current state of knowledge, be very certain about the 
proper way to take these factors into account. Since our exercise with simulation modeling is 
only focused on feasibility issues, the deeper question concerning modeling accuracy cannot be 
addressed. All we are looking for in a test case is a set of simulations that are qualitatively 
plausible. 
 
6.5 Discussion of Detailed Production Cost Simulation Results 
Using GridView with the SSG-WI 2008 Base Case as the starting point and incorporating the 
“no marginal losses approach” described above, we examined the results of two different types 
of simulations. First, we examined the results of simulations in which there are no forced outages 
and gas prices vary across the simulations.  Second, we examined the results of simulations in 
which gas prices were fixed, but each simulation differed with respect to the specific forced 
outages that were modeled. 
 
Taken as a whole, it is hard to reconcile the results of these simulations with observed prices in 
the West. We conclude that these simulations have limited value for market monitoring 
screening, at least for the near future, for several reasons.  First, in the regions that are the most 
directly relevant to the analysis of wholesale prices, e.g., Arizona—the location of the Palo 
Verde hub, the prices produced by the simulation seem to vary in a relatively narrow range that 
suggests that some gas-fired resource is almost always on the margin (e.g., see the line labeled 
AZNMNV in Figure 14).  Moreover, because the assumed heat rates of gas-fired units lie within 
a relatively narrow range, even as the identity of the marginal, price-setting unit changes, prices 
do not change very much.  Second, the simulations seem to produce far smaller inter-regional 
price differentials than have been observed historically, perhaps because of the manner in which 
losses are modeled or because of heat rate assumptions.  Third, to the extent that the model 
produces price spikes outside of the narrow range in which the prices for the vast majority of 
hours fall, it is not transparent how the model arrives at these prices. 
 
We do not have precise information about the resource and transmission assumptions used in the 
Gridview model data set.  However, based on conversations with ABB, we strongly suspect that 
the primary reason that the model produces results that appear unrealistic by current standards is 
that it assumes a significantly different resource mix and substantial transmission additions 
relative to the resources and transmission that currently exist. 
 
                                                 
58 See Smith and Winkler (2006). A similar argument appears in Hobbs and Hepenstal, (1989).    
59 Examples include the “winner’s curse” phenomenon in auctions, where the highest bidder is the most optimistic 
and therefore sure to be wrong, and the survivorship bias in the estimation of mutual fund or hedge fund returns, 
where the failed firms are not counted in the averages.  
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6.5.1 Simulation results for Scenarios with Varying Gas Prices 
ABB produced simulation results for three gas price scenarios: $5, 7, and 9/MMBtu. The gas 
price sensitivity cases demonstrate that gas is on the margin in many regions much more often 
than is the case in reality.  In addition, the model seems to produce much less transmission 
congestion and much less geographically heterogeneous prices than are observed in reality.  
Undoubtedly, these results are driven by the fact that the simulations exclude outages.  In 
addition, the simulations include gas-fired resources and transmission that do not currently exist. 
 
ABB provided us with the identities of “marginal” units in each hour.  They define units as 
marginal if they are operating at some level between consecutive heat rate blocks.   In a 
competitive market, the variable costs of such marginal units should determine clearing prices.  
Of the approximately 30,000 marginal unit-hours in the $7/MMBtu gas simulation, the vast 
majority of them (>27,000) are gas.   (Multiple units can be marginal in the same hour.) 
 
As might be expected given the preponderance of gas-fired marginal units, average power prices 
more or less scale with gas prices.  In Table 5, we show annual average power prices and 
“market heat rates” by geographic bubble for the $5/MMBtu, $7/MMBtu, and $9/MMBtu gas 
scenarios.  Market heat rates effectively normalize the power prices for changes in gas prices.  In 
a system in which gas is always marginal, market heat rates should not change as gas prices 
change.  As shown in Table 5, the market heat rates do not vary much at each geographic bubble, 
looking across the three gas price scenarios.60   
                                                 
60 To compute the market heat rates, we subtracted $2/MWh from the annual average power price for each bubble to 
account for variable O&M costs and divided by the gas price (e.g., $5/MMBtu, $7/MMBtu, and $9/MMBtu 
respectively) 
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Table 5.  Average prices and market heat rates for gas price sensitivities 
 
Gas price $5/MMBtu $7/MMBtu $9/MMBtu $5/MMBtu $7/MMBtu $9/MMBtu
Area                                     
Alberta 34.12 46.85 58.95 6.4 6.4 6.3
Arizona 43.28 59.58 75.85 8.3 8.2 8.2
BC Hydro 38.41 53.98 69.47 7.3 7.4 7.5
BHB 35.38 50.54 65.51 6.7 6.9 7.1
Black Hills 35 49.78 64.33 6.6 6.8 6.9
Bonanza 34.95 48.3 61.53 6.6 6.6 6.6
Colorado (East) 36.69 50.81 64.55 6.9 7.0 7.0
Colorado (West) 36.65 50.67 64.15 6.9 7.0 6.9
Idaho 39.65 55.69 71.45 7.5 7.7 7.7
IID 46.45 62.86 79.24 8.9 8.7 8.6
IPP 44.98 61.2 77.27 8.6 8.5 8.4
Jim Bridger 38.3 53.72 69.21 7.3 7.4 7.5
KGB 38.76 54.73 70.35 7.4 7.5 7.6
LADWP 41.01 55.51 69.95 7.8 7.6 7.6
LRS 34.75 49.3 63.58 6.6 6.8 6.8
Mexico 45.91 61.53 77.65 8.8 8.5 8.4
Montana 33.86 49.82 65.46 6.4 6.8 7.1
NM 39.38 53.78 67.95 7.5 7.4 7.3
NV 44.16 59.72 75.25 8.4 8.2 8.1
Pacific Northwest (East) 40.26 56.14 71.8 7.7 7.7 7.8
Pacific Northwest (West) 40.77 56.86 72.74 7.8 7.8 7.9
PGE (Bay Area) 47.16 63.41 79.52 9.0 8.8 8.6
PGE (Central Valley) 47.08 63.3 79.4 9.0 8.8 8.6
SCE 45.98 62.12 78.2 8.8 8.6 8.5
SDGE 46.56 62.96 79.35 8.9 8.7 8.6
Sierra Pacific 44.43 60.4 76.17 8.5 8.3 8.2
Utah (North) 40.25 56.41 72.45 7.7 7.8 7.8
Utah (South) 40.22 56.28 72.21 7.6 7.8 7.8
WAPA 45.11 61.43 77.63 8.6 8.5 8.4
Wyoming 35.5 50.35 65.01 6.7 6.9 7.0
Wyoming (SW) 37.59 52.77 67.9 7.1 7.3 7.3
Yellow Tail 34.98 50.4 65.63 6.6 6.9 7.1
Average price ($/MWh) Market heat rates (MMBtu/MWh)
 
 
In addition to producing prices that are low and in a relatively narrow range corresponding 
roughly to the costs of different gas-fired technologies, the model produces prices with relatively 
little temporal and geographic dispersion.  We illustrate this point in Table 6 which compares the 
monthly on-peak61 market heat rates obtained from the production cost simulations for Arizona 
and Pacific Northwest/East bubbles at varying gas prices with the market heat rates derived from 
the raw day-ahead power and gas price data used in our econometric analysis. 
                                                 
61 We use the standard definition of on-peak, i.e., hours ending 7-22 on Monday-Saturday. 
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Table 6.  Observed and simulated on-peak market heat-rates 
2002 2003 2004 2005 $5/MMBtu $7/MMBtu $9/MMBtu
Month
Jan 9.6 8.1 8.0 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.5
Feb 9.6 9.1 8.2 8.2 8.6 8.6 8.5
Mar 10.8 8.7 8.0 7.8 8.7 8.6 8.5
Apr 8.9 8.3 8.3 7.9 8.7 8.7 8.7
May 8.5 8.6 8.9 8.3 8.7 8.6 8.6
Jun 10.9 9.6 8.8 8.7 9.1 8.9 8.9
Jul 13.5 12.2 10.6 11.0 9.2 9.0 9.1
Aug 10.7 10.3 9.5 9.6 9.2 9.0 8.9
Sep 9.6 9.5 8.5 8.6 9.0 8.9 8.8
Oct 8.7 9.8 8.4 8.3 8.7 8.6 8.6
Nov 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.4 8.7 8.6 8.5
Dec 8.8 7.8 8.5 8.1 8.7 8.6 8.5
All 9.8 9.2 8.7 8.6 8.8 8.7 8.7
Jan 8.1 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.9 8.8 8.7
Feb 8.7 8.6 8.0 7.9 8.8 8.8 8.7
Mar 11.2 7.5 7.5 7.6 9.0 8.9 8.8
Apr 6.2 6.4 7.7 7.8 8.8 8.7 8.6
May 6.5 6.0 8.1 6.0 8.8 8.8 8.7
Jun 3.1 6.7 5.8 6.4 8.6 8.6 8.5
Jul 4.0 9.9 9.0 8.9 9.0 8.9 8.8
Aug 6.3 8.6 9.2 8.8 9.3 9.2 9.0
Sep 7.3 9.2 8.2 8.0 9.6 9.3 9.2
Oct 7.9 8.1 8.2 7.7 9.2 9.0 8.9
Nov 7.8 8.2 7.9 8.4 9.0 8.9 8.8
Dec 8.8 7.2 7.8 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9
All 7.2 7.8 7.9 7.9 9.0 8.9 8.8
Palo Verde
Mid-Columbia
Actual GridView simulation results
Arizona
Pacific Northwest-East
  
 
Figure 16 and Figure 17 provide graphical representations of these results for Palo Verde and 
Mid-Columbia respectively. 
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Figure 16.  Observed and simulated on-peak market heat-rates (PV) 
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Figure 17.  Observed and simulated on-peak market heat-rates (Mid-C) 
 
Table 6, Figure 16, and Figure 17 highlight two aspects of the simulation results.  First, the 
simulations do not reproduce observed seasonal fluctuations in market heat-rates.  In particular, 
there is nothing like the dip in prices in the late spring, corresponding to the spring run-off, in the 
simulation results.  In addition, the simulations do not capture observed increases in market heat-
rates in the summer in the Southwest.  Second, the simulations suggest that market heat-rates are 
higher on average in the Pacific Northwest than in the Southwest.  For example, at $7/MMBtu 
gas, the annual average on-peak market heat rate for the Pacific Northwest-East bubble is 8.9 
MMBtu/MWh compared to 8.7 MMBtu/MWh for Arizona.  Again, this is inconsistent with 
recent history. 
 
With respect to geographic price dispersion, congestion into and within California is a salient 
feature of Western wholesale power markets.  We attempted to examine such congestion by 
tabulating the number of hours in which the paths between different bubbles appear to be 
congested based on price differentials between bubbles.  We define the path between two 
bubbles as congested if the price difference exceeds $5/MWh.   
 
Based on this criterion, we observed the following results. 
• In the $7/MMBtu gas price scenario, there are no hours in the year in which there is 
congestion between the Pacific Northwest and Northern California.  By comparison, the 
California ISO claims that there was congestion into Northern California from the 
A Regional Approach to Market Monitoring in the West    
   52
Northwest in approximately 13% of all hours and that the average price differential 
between the regions in those hours was $9/MWh.62   
• Similarly, the simulation finds only 17 hours in the year, in which there is congestion  
into Southern California from Arizona.  By comparison, according to the CAISO, the 
Palo Verde branch group, one of the major interfaces linking Southern California and 
Arizona was congested in the import direction in 8% of all hours (i.e. 700 hours).63  
• In contrast, the simulation seems to overstate congestion within California.  There are 334 
hours of north to south congestion within California in the simulation (~4% of the hours 
in the year).  By comparison, the ISO reports that Path 26, linking northern and southern 
California, was congested in the north to south direction in only 1% of all hours in 2005.  
Perhaps the simulation does not reflect relatively recent transmission upgrades within 
California. Alternatively, the CAISO only manages certain parts of the lines entering 
California, in particular, not those controlled by municipal utilities. It is possible for the 
CAISO portion to be congested when the other portion is not. It is unclear whether 
GridView is modeling such arrangements. 
 
6.5.2 Simulation Results for Cases that Include Unit Outages 
The simulations that include outages should provide a marginally more realistic characterization 
of price formation in the West.  Because we have information from these simulations similar to 
the data that we included in our econometric models, we can estimate similar econometric 
models on the results of the simulations to see whether we get parameter estimates that are 
remotely similar. 
 
In Table 7, we report results of one regression based on the results for the Arizona bubble.  The 
data are hourly and we stack the results of the four outage cases so that there are 35,136 
observations (i.e., four times 8,784 observations).  We report the parameter estimates for a few 
variables of interest.  The regressions include the full set of month, day-of-week dummy 
variables that our econometric model regressions included, which were based on observed 
market data.  In addition, because they are based on hourly data, they also include hour-of-day 
dummies. 
                                                 
62 See Table 5.3 of CAISO (2006).  Note that we are summarizing results for the COI branch group.  The ISO 
managed congestion on this interface for only eleven of the twelve months in 2005.  Beginning December 1, 2005, 
the branch group was split into two parts: one that goes from Oregon to the CAISO control area and another that 
goes from Oregon to the SMUD control area.  
63 Ibid. 
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Table 7.   Results from regression based on simulation results   
 
log(AZ price)
log(AZ load) 0.084
(58.35)**
log(California load) 0.074
(33.76)**
Southwest nuclear outages (MW) 0.000005
(17.32)**
Southwest coal outages (MW) 0.000006
(19.38)**
California nuclear outages (MW) 0.000001
(5.07)**
Observations 35,136        
R-squared 0.86
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
The coefficients on load are approximately 90% smaller than the coefficients that we estimated 
from real data.  Similarly, the coefficients on the amount of baseload nuclear and coal capacity 
that is forced out are approximately four times smaller than the coefficients on nuclear outages 
that we estimated from real data.  This just confirms the claims above that the simulations 
produce very “flat” prices in the sense that supply and demand shocks have very attenuated 
effects on prices. 
 
To the extent that the simulations produce occasional price spikes, it is difficult to develop much 
intuition for why they occur.  Consider the following example: in the second outage case, for 
hour ending 17 on June 25, the price in Arizona is ~$193/MWh.  A combustion turbine is 
deemed marginal in Arizona, but the clearing price is far in excess of its costs.  The prices 
produced by the simulation for this specific hour on this day exhibit significant geographic 
dispersion ranging from the mid-20s east of the Rockies, to around 70 in Northern California, to 
the 80s and 90s in Southern California, to the 40s in the Pacific Northwest.  Nevertheless, the 
simulation results indicate that only three units are marginal in the West in the hour so that even 
relatively large price differentials within zones consisting of many bubbles are due to losses.  
Can losses alone plausibly explain a $20 differential between Northern and Southern California?  
Other hours with high prices in specific bubbles exhibit similar anomalies. 
 
6.6 Final Observations Regarding Production Cost Modeling for Market Monitoring 
Purposes 
The foregoing analysis reflects our attempts to gain additional insight into price formation in the 
West based on the results of several simulations of the Western power market.  We found the 
exercise to be challenging for the reasons described above.  None of this is to suggest that there 
is anything wrong with the simulations per se or that they are internally inconsistent or that they 
might not be useful for other purposes besides market monitoring.  Instead, it suggests that they 
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reflect load, resource, and other assumptions that are sufficiently far-removed from reality as to 
be rendered not useful to understand price formation and hence not useful for market monitoring 
purposes in the near future.  Alternatively, the simulations may do a good job of capturing the 
physical reality of the Western power market, but recent prices may reflect other factors, 
potentially including the exercise of market power.   This is a potential challenge associated with 
the econometric approach to market monitoring that we have described above.  As discussed 
previously, to identify prices as abnormal, it is necessary to take a stand on what constitutes 
normal prices.  In the absence of any significant claims of market abuse in the last few years, we 
would argue that observed prices are normal by some measure and hence can be used to establish 
preliminary competitive benchmarks for identifying abnormal prices that may warrant further 
analysis. 
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7. The Role of Company-specific Market Monitors and Independent Evaluators in the 
West 
The preceding sections focused on the types of market monitoring that a West-wide market 
monitor might perform.  In this section we briefly review the role of existing independent 
evaluators (IEs) and company-specific market monitors (MMs) in the West.  The roles of these 
existing market monitors are relatively limited.  On the other hand, they have access to data that 
a West-wide market monitor might not have. 
 
7.1 Definition of Independent Evaluators/company-specific Market Monitors 
In situations where there is potential for competitive problems, FERC and state commissions 
have opted for the use of company-specific market monitors or independent evaluators to 
oversee the behavior of regulated utilities.  IE’s typically monitor long-term procurement by 
utilities when there is the potential for the utility to favor an affiliate’s proposal.  MMs review 
utilities’ behavior in short-term wholesale power and transmission markets where there is the 
potential for a utility to exercise local market power in wholesale power markets or to operate its 
transmission and generation assets in a manner that effectively denies access to non-utility 
generators.  Despite the difference in focus, there is some commonality in the IE and MM 
functions.64  
 
7.2 Affiliate Abuse is the Dominant Concern 
The dominant concern addressed by IEs and company-specific MMs is that regulated vertically 
integrated utilities might abuse their monopoly transmission assets or their monopsonistic 
position as a buyer of power or their affiliation with owners of generation. Dedicated IEs and 
MMs are necessary because of the complex technical issues involved in either short-run power 
system operation or the economic evaluation of new resources through long-term procurements.  
 
A principal purpose of the IE or MM is to assure “fairness” in the utility’s evaluation of power-
supply offers or requests for transmission service by third parties. In the context of electricity 
markets, given their complexity, assuring fairness requires some independent assessment that 
relevant economic factors, business issues, and engineering constraints are being applied 
appropriately and accurately. That is, there needs to be some independent norm of proper or 
efficient behavior against which to determine a “fair” outcome – one that is consistent with 
reaching “just and reasonable” rates when the utility is purchasing power, and one that is non-
discriminatory when it is providing access to monopoly transmission resources.  
 
Fairness cannot be assessed without some concern for efficiency and appropriateness. One can 
always toss dice to determine who gets transmission access or power procurement contracts. 
Such a process is “fair” because no one is being discriminated against. Tossing dice, however, is 
not an efficient or appropriate way to allocate transmission or procure new resources.  
                                                 
64 The FERC Order in the OG&E/NRG McClain case (108 FERC ¶ 61,004, July 2, 2004) discusses an interesting 
mix of long-term procurement and short-term wholesale market issues. In this case FERC decided that the 
acquisition by a regulated utility of an independent power project raised competitive issues that were best addressed 
by retaining an MM until OG&E joined a functioning RTO.  
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The extent to which an IE or MM can determine efficiency and appropriateness is a question we 
addressed by looking at several specific examples. We review the First Quarter 2006 MM report 
for Public Service of New Mexico (PNM) and the testimony provided by Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company (PG&E)’s IE (Sedway Consulting) regarding new resource procurement. 
 
7.3 Potomac Economics PNM Report 
As a condition of the PNM merger with Texas-New Mexico Power Company, FERC approved a 
PNM proposal that it employ a MM who would issue quarterly reports.65 The MM, Potomac 
Economics, is charged with detecting any anticompetitive conduct in which PNM may engage 
from operating its transmission system, including the effect of PNM generation dispatch on the 
transmission system. We review the public version of the Potomac Economics (PE) report that 
covers the First Quarter of 2006 (PE Report, May 2006). It is our understanding that all MM 
reports follow the same format.66 This discussion will illustrate the use of both public and 
confidential information by the MM, the comparatively imprecise standards for evaluating 
behavior, and the narrow geographic scope of analysis. 
 
The PE report first “evaluates” wholesale power prices in the PNM market area after-the-fact by 
comparing the Platt’s Four Corners (FC) daily bilateral contract price with “the daily cost of 
natural gas in the region.”67 The gas cost is converted to a power price at 8,000 Btu/kWh and 
plotted in Figure 1 of the report along with the Four Corners price and the PNM peak load. The 
figure shows a close relationship between gas and power costs; PE says the correlation is 94%. 
Figure 2 shows the gas/power relationship by month (January, February and March) from 2003-
2006. This figure shows that “electricity prices have generally moved with natural gas prices 
over time.”  This analysis, which appears to be based on public data, is a bit informal compared 
to the econometric models described in Section 5 of this study or the market heat rate 
calculations in Table 6 above. PE does not examine the connection between FC prices and those 
at the larger regional trading hub at Palo Verde. If PNM did, in fact, manipulate the FC price, 
how would the MM know? 
 
The bulk of the report focuses on confidential PNM data.  PNM’s purchase and sale data is 
summarized briefly in Figure 3, which is redacted in the public version. These data show that on 
average PNM was a net buyer, and therefore did not have an incentive to exercise market power 
to raise wholesale prices. In a subsequent section, PE examines the relationship between PNM 
transaction prices and transmission congestion. Before making this assessment, PE presents 
some data analyzing PNM transmission system performance more generally. Figures 4 and 5 
                                                 
65 See 110 FERC  61,204, March 2, 2005. 
 
66 FERC first approved a company-specific MM as an interim measure for American Electric Power (AEP) system 
in conjunction with requiring AEP to join an RTO (91 FERC ¶ 61,208, 2000). The PNM market monitoring plan is 
modeled on one approved in connection a FERC decision involving Unisource’s acquisition of transmission assets 
(see 109 FERC ¶ 61,047, 2004).  See 110 FERC ¶ 61,204, 2005 for the PNM order. 
 
67 It is not completely clear from the text whether the FC price is for peak deliveries or exactly what the gas delivery 
location is.  
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show that PNM is making the full capability of the critical Four Corners West Mesa path 
available for use (p. 13). Figures 6, 7, and 8 summarizes data on requests for transmission access. 
PE finds no evidence that PNM acted to restrict access (p. 15).  Figure 9, which is redacted in the 
public version, presents daily data on PNM sales prices and days when short term transmission 
requests were denied. PE finds “no significant difference between sales prices on days with 
refusals versus all other days” (p. 17).  
 
Next PE examines whether PNM may have denied transmission access due to uneconomic 
dispatch of its own generation. Doing this requires some notion of economic dispatch. PE 
constructs a supply stack model.68 PE recognizes that its model neglects the kinds of internal 
system operating constraints capable of being represented in production cost models, but 
concludes that the costs of that approach would exceed its benefits (p. 20). The supply stack is 
adjusted for PNM-reported outages. Using the supply-stack approach, PE calculates the amount 
of out-of-merit generation by day and plots it along with path flow levels and days with 
transmission service denials in Figure 11. PE finds “no evidence that out-of-merit dispatch 
events limited access” (p.21).  
 
The PE analysis covers a period of time when there do not appear to have been any shocks to the 
regional power system, such as major facility outages or unusually high loads. It is unclear, 
however, how PE’s methods would identify any such shocks or determine whether the response 
to them was “normal” or not. For example, it is not apparent whether the MM’s approach would 
enable it to determine whether PNM had the ability to influence the FC bilateral price.  If the 
market were “dysfunctional” in some broad sense, how could the MM tell? If there were 
abnormal relationships between FC prices and those at Palo Verde, would the MM’s approach 
pick them up?  If a regional shock induced PNM to behave in an anti-competitive manner by 
denying transmission access, presumably PE would be able to detect this and report on it. Given 
the narrow mandate for the MM, it is not clear if these broader questions of market performance 
are necessarily within their scope of responsibility. The existence of the MM, however, may be 
sufficient in itself to discipline behavior at least in the PNM market area, if not in the wider 
region. 
 
7.4 Sedway Consulting Testimony and Report on PG&E RFO 
The California Public Utilities Commission has mandated the use of an Independent Evaluator 
(IE) in resource procurements undertaken by regulated electric utilities when an affiliate of the 
utility may participate or has an active proposal under consideration by the utility (CPUC, 2004). 
A substantial concern in utility procurements of generation is that the buyer’s economic and 
financial interests can skew the evaluation process. This might occur if there were offers by 
utility affiliates, or if the utility were to become an owner of the facilities offered.  PG&E 
retained Sedway Consulting (Sedway) for PGE’s 2004 Long Term Request for Offers (RFO). 
Sedway filed testimony and a report documenting its work as the IE for this process. We review 
these documents briefly, emphasizing the extent to which Sedway carried out independent 
market assessment activities (as opposed to focusing on Sedway’s review of PGE’s procurement 
processes themselves).  
                                                 
68 Figure 10, which is redacted in the public version, is the PE supply stack. 
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In the PG&E RFO there were no affiliate bids.69 Nonetheless, there were offers that resulted in 
utility ownership.  In some cases, these were projects that could have been sold to PG&E or 
where the output could have been purchased from a third party under a long term contract. 
Ultimately the ownership option was selected rather than the contract option (Taylor, 2006b, 
pp.24-30). The IE specifically supported the lack of bias in the process that ultimately led to the 
regulatory approval of the selection of the ownership option (Taylor, 2006a, pp.28-9). 
 
The majority of the effort documented in the Sedway’s report was process-oriented: monitoring 
of communications, confirmation of calculations, review of negotiations, assessment of non-
price factors qualitatively.70 A few issues regarding methods and data in the PG&E case are 
worth a brief discussion. 
 
PG&E used a spread option model to estimate benefits of the bids. Spread options are a 
particular kind of option for which the payoff is related to the difference between the prices of 
two different products. These were first used as a strictly financial instrument in commodity 
markets other than electricity.71  They have subsequently been introduced into electricity trading, 
and then into the valuation of electricity contracts and projects, where the spread is typically 
between power and gas prices.72  Sedway observes that the use of this approach by PG&E is 
unique for long-term resource evaluation. Spread option methods are usually used for short-term 
trading (Taylor, 2006b, p.8). Even so, it may be appropriate to use such models in resource 
planning.  Peaking projects, for example, may be under-valued without the use of option 
methods, because so much of their benefit comes from being able to hedge against infrequent 
price spikes.  This “option value” is frequently underestimated or ignored by more traditional 
valuation methods. As part of its evaluation, Sedway uses its own model, which it “calibrates” to 
the PG&E model. It is unclear whether this calibration represents an independent replication of 
the results in the PG&E model or not. The brief example illustrating the process seems more like 
linear interpolation than independent replication of the underlying algorithm (Taylor, 2006b, 
Appendix B). 
 
To summarize, the independent evaluator’s activities in this case are more of an audit function 
than an independent assessment of value. Sedway does not provide its own assessment of such 
key drivers of value as future gas prices. Some commentators on the IE process have suggested 
that such forecasts be done by the IE.73  However, there are disagreements about whether the IE 
                                                 
69 The IE documents do not say explicitly that there were no affiliate bids, but the issue is never discussed. PG&E 
had an unregulated affiliate that filed for bankruptcy and whose asserts were turned over to lenders. 
 
70 In this way, Sedway’s role was similar to the role of the independent monitor overseeing recent procurements by 
the Arizona investor-owned utilities. The standards applied to those procurements by the ACC were fairness and 
consistency. The independent monitor report is available on the Arizona Corporation Commission website (Accion 
Group, 2003).  
 
71 W. Margrabe, (1978) and D. Shimko, (1994). 
 
72 See Deng, S. J., B. Johnson, and A. Sogomonian, (2001). 
 
73 Electric Power Supply Association (2004). 
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function should go that far.  The more limited interpretation of the IE role as an audit function 
still leaves open the question of whether algorithm replication is the audit standard or not. With 
complex production cost or spread option methods, there is opportunity for manipulation of 
calculations.74 Independent replication of algorithms would address the manipulation concern. In 
this case, it is unclear exactly what the Sedway model does, but the limited discussion suggests 
the evaluation does not attempt algorithm replication. 
 
7.5 Regional and State Linkages 
At present, the activities of IE and MM in the West do not involve regional assessments. This is 
more of an issue for the MM than the IE. While the economic evaluations overseen by IEs 
clearly examine interactions between the activities of an entity within a state and the broader 
regional market, it is not clear that failing to assess the state/region linkage really limits the IE in 
any important way.  It is less clear that a company-specific MM can be maximally effective 
absent a more explicit regional view or focus on behaviors within the region. This is not to say 
that MM activities are not useful, only that they are limited and may miss effects that are 
otherwise important to uncovering dysfunctionalities in a regional power market. 
 
 
                                                 
74 This issue is discussed in a FERC case involving affiliate transactions resulting from a solicitation for contracts 
(FERC, 2005b at ¶ 42-51). 
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8. Conclusions 
This study has examined the feasibility of West-wide market monitoring given readily available 
data.  Because the West outside of California and Alberta does not have RTOs that perform 
centralized unit commitment and dispatch, the rich data that are typically available to market 
monitors in RTO markets are not available in much of the West.75  We develop simple 
econometric models of wholesale power prices in the West that might be used for market 
monitoring.  We also examine whether production cost simulations that have been developed for 
long-run planning might be useful for market monitoring.  We find that simple econometric 
models go a long ways towards explaining wholesale power prices in the West and might be 
used to identify potentially anomalous prices.  In contrast, we find that the simulated prices from 
a specific set of production cost simulations exhibit characteristics that are sufficiently different 
from observed prices that we question their usefulness for explaining price formation in the West 
and hence their usefulness as a market monitoring tool. 
 
If a monitoring function based on the kind of econometric modeling illustrated here is thought to 
be a desirable, albeit second-best, alternative, then there are institutional questions that need to 
be addressed. What is the preferred institutional arrangement for such a function? How might it 
be supported both financially and intellectually? These questions are outside the scope of the 
present effort, but are a logical next step for market participants, stakeholders and policymakers 
interested in West-wide market monitoring.  
 
 
                                                 
75 While we fully acknowledge the wide range of views about the costs and benefits of RTO, one undisputed benefit 
is that RTO tend to produce voluminous amounts of detailed operational and price data for market monitoring. 
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Appendix A. GridView Simulations 
 
A.1 Introduction 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and The Analysis Group conducted a study for the 
Western Interstate Energy Board Committee on Regional Power Cooperation (CREPC) that 
draws upon the SSG-WI 2008 reference case data.  ABB assisted the Analysis Group to deliver 
the following results: 
 
• For each hour of year 2008 simulation, report on the marginal thermal generators in each 
of the 33 (or so) zones of the SSG-WI simulation topology. The definition of a marginal 
thermal unit is one that is operating at some level above its minimum operating output 
level and below its maximum output level. The reported results include fuel type, 
variable cost (variable fuel, O&M and emissions cost if applicable), and zone.   
• There were three SSG-WI simulations of calendar year 2008 based on three different 
assumptions about gas prices: low ($5/MMBtu), medium ($7/MMBtu) and high 
($9/MMBtu). 
 
ABB’s GridView Market Simulation Software was used for this analysis.  The core of GridView 
is a transmission constrained unit commitment and economic dispatch algorithm as shown in 
Figure A-1.  GridView mimics the operation of an electric market by dispatching units based on 
their bid prices while taking into account the flow limits on transmission lines and interfaces 
under normal, as well as under contingency conditions.  The outputs from a GridView simulation 
include information such as hourly unit dispatch, locational marginal prices (LMP) at buses, flow 
on lines, and congestion cost of limiting lines.  
 
In this analysis, units in the WECC system were assumed to bid their variable costs in the energy 
market, which was calculated by adding the fuel, and variable operation and maintenance costs.   
This is a valid assumption during most hours except when the market has a tight reserve margin 
or when certain units exercise market power.   
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Figure A-1  GridView’s simplified block diagram   
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A.2 Data and Assumptions 
In this section, ABB summarizes key input data and assumptions used in this study. The SSG-WI 
2008 reference database was used to create three scenarios with different fuel price options: low 
($5/MMBtu), medium ($7/MMBtu) and high ($9/MMBtu). 
  
A.2.1 Load and Capacity Assumptions 
The geographical location of load in the transmission system is given by the bus to which the 
load is connected.  Groups of load buses (a bus having at least one load connected to it) are 
organized into bubble areas.  An annual load profile in EEI format is assigned to each bubble 
area to describe the hourly load variation during the entire year. Those area load profiles were 
created based on 2008 SSG-WI load forecast data. GridView assigns the area’s load shape to 
each bus within that area using the ratio of that bus’ load to the region load. The maintenance 
algorithm in GridView was used to create the maintenance schedule for all units.  The available 
capacity for each region is calculated from the installed capacity and the capacity that is on 
maintenance. 
 
A.2.2 Transmission System Assumptions 
In the SSG-WI database, all transmission lines with voltage level equal to or greater than 345-kV 
were monitored (the thermal limits were enforced during economic dispatch). All interfaces and 
critical nomograms in WECC path rating catalog were modeled and monitored.  
 
A.2.3 Calculation Assumptions 
The transmission security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) and economic dispatch (SCED) 
used in the simulation requires generation cost data (e.g., incremental heat rate or bid prices) and 
MW limitations on individual circuits, transmission interfaces and individual generating units to 
calculate: 
 
• The minimum cost of generation dispatch that satisfies the nomograms and transmission 
constraints;  
• Locational Marginal Price (LMP) for each bus in the system; 
• Committed capacity to meet the reliability needs (RMR units); 
• Constraints affecting economic operation, affecting price levels or causing transmission 
bottlenecks that level the prices in different price zones. 
 
SCUC and SCED for the market minimize all incurred costs while serving the load subject to 
network constraints and ensure operating reliability. It has been well established76 that economic 
dispatch models mimic the behavior of a competitive market for wholesale power such as the 
WECC market and reveal the varying clearing prices for power throughout the system. It was 
sensible to use this model to investigate the expected operation of the generators participating in 
the WECC markets and the resulting production cost variations and congestion situations in the 
transmission system.  
                                                 
76 See Schweppe. Caramanis, Tabors and Bohn, (1988). 
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Marginal losses were included in the calculation with distributed reference buses. 
 
Wheeling Charges representing transmission access charge tariff between different ISO 
controlled regions were included in the simulation. The average wheeling rate was $2.8/MWh. 
 
The transmission constraints can be branch thermal ratings, operating nomograms, or voltage and 
stability in the form of interface limits under normal and contingency conditions. The 
nomograms in GridView are mathematically expressed as an inequality, where the left hand side 
of the inequality is a linear combination of power flows on relevant transmission interfaces, 
generator output, and/or area loads.  
 
To reflect the day-ahead bidding settlement in the market, only inter-zonal transmission 
constraints, which were modeled as interfaces and nomograms, were enforced during security 
constrained unit commitment (SCUC) optimization loop. During security constrained economic 
dispatch (SCED), both inter-zonal and intra-zonal transmission constraints, which were 
represented by individual branch thermal limits, were enforced. 
 
